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ABSTRACT
This thesis p resen ts  a  case study  in the  determ ination of the 
archaeological significance of a  battlefield site. It p resen ts a  general 
d iscussion of battlefield archaeology, a  discussion of archaeological 
significance, an d  a  case study  of the Battlefield a t W illiamsburg, a  sm all 
Civil W ar battle fought on May 4-5, 1862. The rem ains of a  Confederate 
defensive line consisting of 15 defensive s tru c tu re s  were identified and  
m apped. The line w as found to be significant as  an  example of a  m id­
n ineteen th  cen tury  defensive line. Furtherm ore, th ree o ther sections of 
the battlefield were identified th a t may yield archaeological resources 
relating to the battle. The thesis also m akes recom m endations for 
additional fieldwork on the battlefield.
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BATTLEFIELD ARCHAEOLOGY: A CASE STUDY
Figure 1. The Battle of W illiamsburg (Lesliel992).
C h a p te r  1:
Battlefield Archaeology
Monday, May 5th, 1862. W illiamsburg, Virginia. Confederate 
General Jo seph  E. Johnston , com m anding the Army of Northern 
Virginia, h a s  moved his com m and to the old colonial capital after 
abandoning Yorktown on May 3rd. The re trea t w as executed under 
th rea t of an  im pending siege by Union forces u n d er G eneral George B. 
McClellan, com m anding the Army of the Potomac. McClellan had  been 
placing heavy siege guns along Jo h n sto n 's  Yorktown line for over a  
m onth  after moving h is arm y from W ashington D.C. to the Virginia 
pen insu la  for a  projected a ttack  on Richmond, the Confederate capital. 
Fortunately  for Jo h n sto n , McClellan’s p lan  was to move all h is guns into 
position before opening fire on the rebel line. W hen the siege seem ed 
im m inent, Jo h n sto n  fled u nder cover of darkness hoping to move his 
com m and to the Richm ond defenses before McClellan could catch  him.
The re trea t took McClellan by complete surprise. All h is 
intelligence h ad  reported th a t the rebels would stay  and  fight in 
Yorktown. He had  no t even considered th e  possibility of a  re trea t and  it 
w as over 12 hours after the discovery of the m issing rebel arm y th a t he 
launched  any  infantry  (General Joseph  Hooker’s division from the Third 
Corps and  G eneral William S m ith ’s from the Fourth) in pu rsu it.
Despite the head sta rt, however, Jo h n sto n  w as having difficulty 
moving h is artillery and  supply  wagons due to soggy, m uddy roads, a  
situation  com pounded by a  heavy ra in  th a t began falling early on the 
m orning of the  5th . Furtherm ore, Union cavalry u n d er G eneral George
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Stonem an h ad  reached the Confederate rear guard  late on the afternoon 
of the  4 th  an d  skirm ished briefly. Fearing the advance of Federal 
infantry behind the cavalry and  the delays caused  by m ud, Jo h n sto n  
needed to buy some time. To h is great fortune, Confederate G eneral 
Jo h n  B. M agruder, in com m and of the pen insu la  prior to h is arrival, had  
fortified a  three mile line of defense between the  College and  Q ueen s 
Creeks ab o u t two miles so u th -east of W illiamsburg. The line consisted  
of a  large ea rthen  fort (Fort Magruder), 12 earthen  redoubts, two earthen  
redans, rifle pits, and  obstacles (see figure 2). Jo h n sto n  ordered h is 
Second Division, u n d er G eneral Jam es Longstreet, to occupy the line 
and  block the  approach of the Union arm y--in m ilitary parlance, to fight 
a  delaying action while the  rem ainder of Jo h n s to n ’s arm y escaped to 
Richmond. The F ourth  Division, u n d er G eneral D.H. Hill, spen t the 
night of May 4 th  in W illiamsburg and  w as available to Longstreet on the 
5 th  as  a  reserve.
W hen Union G eneral Jo sep h  Hooker reached the W illiamsburg 
defenses a t daw n on May 5th, he deployed sk irm ishers to probe the line 
an d  placed h is artillery on the only road leading to Fort M agruder. 
Longstreet responded by opening fire from his guns in Fort M agruder and  
the Battle for W illiamsburg h ad  begun (Kettenburg 1980; OR, XI, Pt. 1; 
Sears 1992).
The study  of w ar as cu ltu ra l phenom ena is a  m ajor them e in 
American anthropology. Indeed, two national sym posia (Fried et. al. 
1968; H aas 1990) an d  a  num ber of sessions a t the an n u a l m eetings of 
various anthropological associations have dealt exclusively with war. 
Addressing such  issues as the origin of war, the role of war in complex 
societies, w ar as  a  tool of economic an d  political oppression, and  the
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Figure 2. The W illiamsburg Defenses, May 1862 (Kettenburg 1980).
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6m otivations for arm ed conflict, anthropologists have endeavored to 
expand our understand ing  of w ar as part of the to tal h u m an  experience.
Yet despite the m any contribu tions from cu ltu ra l anthropology, 
archaeologists have largely lagged behind in the s tu d y  of war. While it is 
true  th a t archaeologists have studied  a  variety of m ilitary sites such  as 
fortifications an d  encam pm ents, very little a tten tion  h as  been payed to 
the study  of battlefields. At least one archaeologist h as  even suggested 
th a t archaeology h as  very little to contribute to the study  of battles and 
w ars (Noel Hume 1969). Several recent investigations, however, have 
show n otherwise. B arka (1976), Ferguson (1977), Gould (1983), Scott et. 
al. (1989), Fox (1993), an d  Geier and  W inter (1994), for example, have all 
produced insightful reports based  on the ir excavations a t various historic 
battlefields. Furtherm ore, SI. V end  (1984) h as  developed a 
com prehensive body of theory for the study  of battlefields th rough  
archaeology. As Fox notes, “Archaeology is  a  useful tool for studying 
battlefield sites, an d  m uch can  be sa id  abou t battles in particu lar and  
warfare in general (Fox 1993: 4).”
The purpose of th is thesis is to p resen t a  case study  for assessing  
the archaeological significance of Civil W ar battlefields. S uch  a  study  is 
necessary  due to the relative lack of published inform ation on battlefield 
archaeology in general an d  Civil War battlefields in particu lar. The 
problem  is relevant given the  m any recent controversies in battlefield 
preservation, for example, a t Brandy S tation, Virginia and  Gettysburg, 
Pennsylvania (Sipkoff 1993a, 1993b, 1994a, 1994b, 1994c). As more and  
more battlefield sites are th rea tened  with development, it is increasingly 
necessary  to define how archaeology can contribute to our understand ing  
of war. Furtherm ore, a  general d iscussion  of battlefield significance begs 
the question, w hat role should  archaeologists play in battlefield
7preservation.
These are not simple questions. How we define battlefield 
significance will determ ine the level of archaeology, if any, undertaken  at 
the site. Because of the size of m any battlefields, the question of scale 
plays a  m ajor role in the  definition of significance. Access to the 
battlefield in toto may no t be unrestricted; th is in itself m ay produce 
dilem m a’s in term s of the  types of questions battlefield archaeologists 
m ay address. The ability to recognize patterns, for example, m ay be 
com prom ised if an  insufficient area  is tested. The public also plays a 
m ajor role in how we determ ine significance. Battlefields frequently 
enjoy broad public support, particularly  Civil W ar battlefields. Round 
tables an d  historic preservation societies m ay provide m oral support and  
work as a  lobby for preservation. They m ay also produce unscrupu lous 
collectors and  looters.
In the following chapters, I sort through these problem s by way of 
a  case study. The Battlefield a t W illiamsburg is an  ideal exam ple 
because it is partially destroyed, spread over a  considerable area, shows 
evidence of looting, and  enjoys public support in the form of a  local Civil 
War Round Table and  preservation committee. Broadly, I define the 
battlefield as a  tactically significant, cu ltu ra l landscape. E m phasis is 
placed on the spatia l definition of battlefield features, including terrain, 
and  a  spatia l analysis of recovered artifacts. C hapter Two begins with a 
general d iscussion  of battlefield archaeology as a  legitim ate focus in the 
discipline, reviews pertinen t literature, and  highlights the  potential of 
battlefield archaeology in particu lar as  exemplified by Scott et. al. (1989) 
and  Fox (1993) a t the battlefield of the  Little Big Horn. C hapter Three 
d iscusses the concept of significance in archaeology an d  how it applies to 
historic battle sites. C hapter Four describes the history  of the Battle of
8W illiamsburg. C hapter Five describes the  cu ltu ra l resources rem aining 
from the battle. And Finally, C hap ter Six d iscusses the  significance of 
those resources an d  offers recom m endations for additional fieldwork and  
preservation / m anagem ent op tions.
C h a p te r  2:
The Archaeology of B attles an d  W ars
A com prehensive in troduction  to battlefield archaeology requires
an  understand ing  of how archaeologists have defined and  interpreted the
evidence for war. The following chap ter highlights theoretical and
methodological con tribu tions to the  archaeology of w ar an d  describes the
types of evidence used  in its in terpretation.
Archaeologists are able to in terpret p a s t h u m an  behavior,
including warfare, on the basis of artifact p a tte rn  recognition. Behavior
exhibits a  certain  degree of regularity, or patterning, because it is guided
by cu ltu ra l ru les th a t define desirable behavior (Hodder 1977, 1993;
Fagan 1991; S ou th  1977). As Fagan notes:
The concept of cu ltu re  provides anthropological 
archaeologists w ith a  m eans for explaining the  p roducts of 
hu m an  activity. W hen archaeologists s tudy  p a tte rn s  of 
discard, or the tangible rem ains of the past, they see a  
pa tterned  reflection of the cu ltu re th a t produced them , of 
the shared  behavior of a  group of...people. This pattern ing  of 
archaeological finds is critical, for it reflects p a tterned  
behavior in the p a s t (Fagan 1991: 38-39.
Archaeologists m ake inferences abou t the p as t on the  basis of th is 
relationship .
Like o ther aspects of h u m an  behavior, w arfare is patterned
because it is governed by a  se t of cu ltu ra l ru les th a t define how they are
fought. According to Scott et. al., for example,:
Battlefields m ay seem  an  unlikely place to look for hum an  
behavioral pa ttern s, since they represen t the m ost violent 
expressions of hu m an  behavior, bu t it is precisely for th a t 
reason th a t behavioral p a tte rn s  are likely to be evident.
W arfare h as  special ru les by which it is practiced. W ithin 
our own cu ltu re  (for example) th is m ay be seen in the 
preparation  an d  train ing  given m em bers of the military. This
9
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tra in ing  is given in order th a t those engaged in battle would 
perform  their du ties based  on the ir train ing and  respond to 
orders w ithout dwelling on the consequences. That is 
pa tterned  behavior (Scott et. al. 1989: 6).
It should  be noted, however, th a t behavioral expectations in tim es 
of w ar are unique to individual cu ltu res an d  no t universal. These norm s 
an d  expectations m ay vary from one cu ltu re to another. The Aztecs, for 
example, often waged w ar to obtain  victims for religious sacrifice. The 
goal of battle  w as to cap tu re  ra th e r th a n  kill the enem y and  it continued 
un til enough victims were taken  (Walsh an d  S ugiura 1991). As a  result, 
we m u st never assum e th a t ou r own understand ing  of w ar constitu tes a 
model applicable to o ther cu ltures.
I shou ld  also note th a t the  goal of archaeological research  is no t 
sim ply the  identification of a  particu lar p a tte rn  in the ground. If all an  
archaeologist can say abou t a  particu lar battle site is th a t they have 
identified the “battlefield p a tte rn ,” th en  they  have no t contributed  
anyth ing  significant to our understand ing  of the battle. The archaeology 
becom es nothing more th a n  an  exercise in curiosity. Rather, it is the 
job  of the archaeologist to an ticipate  the p a tte rn s  likely to emerge from a  
specified action (such as combat) an d  m ake inferences abou t the  p as t on 
the basis of any deviation from those expectations. For example, if an  
infantry  regim ent fought according to s tan d ard  m ilitaiy doctrine, then  
the artifact pattern ing  should  reflect th a t behavior (Scott et. al. 1989; 
Fox 1993).
It is possible to an ticipate likely p a tte rn s  on the  basis of surviving 
docum ents and  m an u als  th a t proscribe w hat a t the  time w as seen as the 
m ost efficient m eans to execute m ilitary du ty  (see Sheppard  1972). At 
the tim e of the Civil War, for example, the United S ta tes Army and  Navy 
had  produced a  variety of tactical m anuals  to govern military behavior, 
including com bat action. We th u s  have a  large body of docum entary
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evidence to reconstruct the  behavioral ru les of com bat in historic tim es. 
As a  result, we can predict the types of pa tte rn s one could expect from 
specific com bat actions (Scott et. al. 1989; Fox 1993).
M ilitary S ites  Archaeology in  North America
Battlefield archaeology falls u n d er the purview of m ilitary sites 
archaeology, a  discipline devoted to the  study  of sites associated  w ith a 
variety of m ilitary activities. These sites include, for example, m ilitary 
encam pm ents, field and  perm anen t fortifications, shipw recks, an d  
battlefields. Battlefields m ay include o ther types of m ilitary sites, such  
as fortifications, b u t the defining feature of the battlefield is a  site where 
com bat took place.
Few battlefields have been stud ied  by archaeologists w ith the goal 
of contributing  to ou r understand ing  of the battle. Recent stud ies by 
Ferguson (1977), Scott et. al. (1989), and  Fox (1993), however, have 
show n th a t archaeological investigations of battlefields can  produce 
those resu lts. Ferguson’s (1977) stu d y  of Fort W atson, a  British fort in 
S ou th  Carolina, for example, enabled him  to determ ine the location of 
the  American forces besieging the fort and  the  direction of the ir attack . 
Furtherm ore, Scott et. al (1989) an d  Fox (1993) have reconstructed  the 
ebb and  flow of the Battle of the Little Big Horn by in terpreting artifact 
pattern ing  in the  recovery of spen t arm am ents.
Militaiy sites archaeologists have addressed  a  variety of o ther 
research  topics on m ilitary sites. Some have sought to collect d a ta  to 
enable accurate  reconstructions of military s tru c tu re s  or to study  
engineering techniques. Excavations on the Yorktown Battlefield by 
B arka (1976), for example, identified com m unications and  siege trenches
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and  com pared the construction  of various American and  French 
redoubts on the battlefield. Elsewhere, H arrington’s (1978) investigation 
of Fort Necessity revealed the location of the original fort an d  palisade. 
O ther stud ies have focused on the  identification of arch itec tu ra l detail 
in m ilitary structu res. These stud ies have enhanced  our understand ing  
of the engineering principles th a t guided the construction  of m ilitary 
structu res. Babits (1991), for example, h as  stud ied  a rch itec tu ra l detail 
in Civil War defenses in Georgia an d  Beaudry (1983) h as  explored the 
construction  of traverses and  drainage system s a t  Fort McHenry.
O ther archaeologists have focused on cam p life an d  provisioning 
system s a t military sites. Huey (1991), for example, h a s  analyzed 
recovered assem blages from Fort Orange in u p sta te  New York to in terpret 
the  daily life of the soldiers, traders, adm inistra tors, an d  Native 
A m ericans who lived or worked in the fort. Seidel (1990) h as  used  
recovered ceramic w ares to a ssess  s ta tu s  and  living differences between 
officers and  enlisted m en a t m ilitary posts during  the American 
Revolution. Similarly, the  s tu d y  of food assem blages h a s  enabled 
archaeologists to in terp ret social dynam ics w ithin m ilitary populations. 
Losey (1971), for example, h as  stud ied  food refuse from Fort Enterprise 
in C anada to reconstruct social dynam ics in the fort an d  C rass and  
W allsm ith (1992) have com pared faunal assem blages w ith provisioning 
records to reconstruct supply  an d  provisioning system s a t C antonm ent 
Burgwin in New Mexico. M unitions assem blages from Fort Filmore, New 
Mexico have also been used  to reconstruct provisioning system s a t th a t 
frontier ou tpost (Staski and  Jo h n sto n  1992).
Finally, underw ater archaeologists have explored a  num ber of 
shipw recks w ith m ilitary im port. B roadw ater et. al. (1983), for example, 
have identified several sh ips in the York River in Virginia scu ttled  by the
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British prior to their su rrender a t Yorktown. Arnold et. al. (1992) have 
m apped an d  photographed the rem ains of the U.S.S. Monitor to s tudy  in 
detail the construction  of th a t ship. In sum , m ilitaiy sites 
archaeologists have addressed  a  variety of research  in terests a t m ilitary 
sites across North America.
D efining th e  Concept o f  War
The 1992 edition of the  American Heritage D ictionary defines w ar 
as a  “s ta te  of open, arm ed, often prolonged conflict carried on between 
nations, sta tes, or parties (American Heritage D ictionary 1992).” 
A lthough th is  accurately  describes the  sta te  of warfare as  a  violent 
confrontation between opposing parties, the definition is deficient in a t 
least one respect. As McCauly (1992) notes, w ars are both  socially 
sanctioned and  organized expressions of open conflict. As a  result, w ars 
are fought according to culturally  specific ru les th a t identify desirable 
and  undesirab le  com bat actions. This is an  im portan t dim ension to the 
definition for it is these ru les th a t resu lt in patterned  behavior.
The Origins and A ntiquity o f  War
Due to the difficulty of in terpreting  evidence for w ar in the
prehistoric record (see below), it is often assum ed  th a t w ar developed
w ith civilization. This, however, is probably a  reflection of the ab u n d an t
historical evidence for warfare w hen com pared to the prehistoric.
According to Vend:
A possible objection th a t w ars sta rted  to plague hum ank ind  
only since the first occurrence of w ritten sources m ay be 
easily refuted (1) by pointing ou t th a t su ch  an  assum ption  is 
flatly contradicted by u n in te rru p ted  development of 
archaeological evidence for, and  frequency of, weapons,
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fortifications, and  o ther indications of warfare w ithin the 
periods before an d  after the in troduction of literacy; (2) by 
the fact tha t, in w ritten records, the earliest w ars are so 
sophisticated  th a t some preceding development m ust have 
taken  place; (3) by the  observation th a t w ithin individual 
areas of the world, the earliest w ritten records come from 
such  rem ote periods of time and  from such  different 
societies...that they constitu te  neither any coherent 
chronological horizon nor an  identical development and  
cu ltu ra l stage. Moreover, (4) a t tim es, w ritten sources report 
fights even am ong the barbarians, i.e., in a  purely prehistoric 
milieu. And (5) ethnological evidence for w ars in pristine 
societies is ab u n d an t (Vend 1984: 119).
J u s t  how far back the origins go, however, is open to
in terpretation . W hat is clear is th a t low population densities (as we
m ight find in the Paleolithic) lower the  probability of w ar because there
is less opportunity  for conflict over strategic resources. V end  (1984)
suggests th a t warfare could no t develop u n til different societies cam e
into direct com petition for resources an d  he places th is in the
Mesolithic. D uring th is  period, for example, the transition  to a  w arm er
an d  w etter Holocene environm ent encouraged the rapid spread  of
w oodland across Europe. As the biom ass increased, so did the num ber
of h u n te r  groups vying for territory. As V end  notes:
The existence of territories implied border regions....
Increased density  of se ttlem ent and  territorial life in fixed 
hun tin g  grounds created su b stan tia l progress in cu ltu ra l 
differentiation. Emergence of territorial cu ltu ra l u n its  
created conditions for border d ispu tes or d isputes over food 
resources and  over space (Vend 1984: 121).
In addition, the physical evidence for Mesolithic w arfare is 
su b stan tia l. Mesolithic cem eteries from Europe to North Africa have 
produced the rem ains of individuals who died of traum atic  w ounds. In 
m any instances, projectile poin ts were even sticking out of the  bones. It 
is therefore reasonable to conclude th a t warfare a t least dates to the
Mesolithic (V end 1984).
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The dawn of agriculture an d  patoralism  in the Neolithic created 
ideal conditions for arm ed conflict. The accum ulation of w ealth in p lan t 
and  anim al stores set the stage for theft and  plundering. V end  h as even 
suggested “...th a t the Neolithic discovery of harnessing  the force of 
o thers, in p articu lar of anim al labor, constitu ted  a  model for the  idea of 
a  sim ilar exploitation of h u m an  labor (Vend 1984: 120).” He fu rther 
notes the  proliferation of fortifications th roughou t the Neolithic.
C am iero (1990) h as  suggested th a t the net effect of Neolithic 
w arfare w as dispersal. Because m ost d isputes were the resu lt of 
territorial conflict an d  access to resources, defeated populations were 
forced to migrate. As a  result, they could m aintain  some degree of 
sovereignty despite their failure on the  battlefield. As populations grew 
an d  com petition for resources intensified, however, “warfare began 
leading to the subjugation  of the losers by the w inners, an d  to the 
seizure an d  incorporation of the ir territory as well (Carniero 1990: 191).” 
This led to the form ation of chiefdoms an d  eventually the s ta te  (Cam iero 
1970, 1981, 1990).
Evidence
Historical archaeologists have a  d istinct advantage over their 
prehistoric colleagues due to the ir control of tim e and  space th rough 
docum entary  analysis. H istorical archaeologists m ay know in advance, 
for example, the  location of the battle, the  com batants, the  types of 
w eapons fired, the tactics com batan ts were likely to use, an d  background 
contextual inform ation to guide and  stru c tu re  their research  designs. In 
essence, the  historical archeologist h a s  some idea w hat s / h e  is looking 
for. In the  to tal absence of docum ents, however, direct evidence for
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w arfare is often difficult to find. This is so because certain  aspects of
m ilitary behavior (especially prehistoric) do no t appear in the
archaeological record. According to Vend:
Difficulties in explaining the archaeological rem ains of 
w arfare are an  objective expression of the fact th a t (1) some 
im portan t features do no t en ter archaeological contexts 
because of their non-m aterial characte r (political and  
diplom atic negotiations, causes for war, etc.) or because of 
the ir perishable n a tu re  (like w eapons of organic materials), 
or alternatively, for insufficient concentration  in buria l (in 
cases of battles). Archaeology is fu rther characterized by (2) 
a  lim ited capacity to d istinguish  phenom ena following one 
after an o th er in a  sh o rt interval of tim e (e.g. troop transfers) 
an d  by the inability to synchronize spatially isolated 
phenom ena (e.g., village and  fortification fires). Difficulties 
of in terpretation  are brought ab o u t fu rther by (3) the 
undoub ted  primitive and  undifferentiated character of the 
earliest w ars (Vend 1984: 121-122).
As a resu lt, it m ay be difficult to identify prehistoric battlefields.
There axe, however, a  num ber of types of evidence com m on to both 
prehistoric an d  historic battlefields. These include weapons, 
iconography, w arrior’s graves, bodily w ounds, and  fortifications (Vend 
1984). In addition, recent s tud ies of historic m ilitary landscapes have 
produced unique insights into ou r understand ing  of the m eaning and  
experience of battles and  w ars (Deetz 1990; Shackel 1994). The following 
sections briefly d iscuss each of these categories and  provide exam ples 
were appropriate.
W eapons
Evidence for prehistoric w eaponry is largely limited to inorganic 
rem ains such  a s  stone tools. V end  (1984) suggests th a t th is  h as  led to 
the underestim ation  of the im portance of w arfare in prehistoric societies. 
Some sites with exceptional preservation, however, have produced wood
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javelins, spears, clubs, and  m aces, and  bone im plem ents. We also know 
from docum entary  sources th a t organic w eapons rem ained a  major 
com ponent of m ilitary arsenals  th roughou t classical antiquity. This 
suggests “..not only the possible d istortion of ou r p icture of the origin of 
w eapons them selves[, ] b u t also the doubtfu lness of archaeological 
estim ates of w eapons in ages of m etal (Vend 1984: 125).” The fact th a t 
organic w eapons do no t preserve well in archaeological contexts is in no 
way proof th a t they did no t exist.
There are also a  num ber of types of w eapons th a t m ay be outright 
impossible to detect in the archaeological record. These include 
unw orked stone, all purpose tools (such as knives and  axes), poisons, 
an im als (such as w ar dogs), and  fire (Vend 1984).
As we move from the Neolithic into the Bronze and  Iron Ages, 
however, the physical evidence for weaponry increases dram atically. 
Bronze or iron projectile points, spears, swords, and  arm or are found 
th roughou t Europe, Africa, an d  the Middle E ast (Fagan 1989; O akeshot 
1960). The Umfield peoples of w est H ungary (c. 1000 BC), for example, 
produced bronze shields, helm ets, an d  a  slashing  sword th a t spread 
th roughou t Europe by 750 BC (Coles an d  Harding 1979). W ar chariots 
are known from Sum er by a t least 3500 BC and  rapidly spread  to Egypt, 
Asia, and  Europe in the next few m illennia (Fagan 1989; O akeshot 
1960).
The history  and  development of historic w eaponry is well 
docum ented. Lewis (1956), Newman (1942), and  Sheppard  (1972), for 
example, have all w ritten  extensively on the the  development an d  history 
of explosive w eapons. McKee an d  M ason (1975) have produced a  detailed 
com pendium  of Civil W ar sm all arm s an d  artillery projectiles to facilitate 
the identification of various types of n ine teen th  cen tury  rounds.
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In recent years, h istorical archaeologists have applied m odem  
firearm s identification and  ballistic analysis to sm all arm  projectiles and  
cartridge cases recovered from archaeological sites. With the help of 
criminology experts from the N ebraska S tate  Patrol, Scott et. al. (1989) 
and  Fox (1993), for example, were able to identify specific cartridge case 
signatu res on cases recovered from the Battle of the Little Big Horn in 
M ontana. These signatures are produced on the case w hen the weapon 
is fired an d  are un ique to individual w eapons. This enabled them  to 
identify which cartridges were fired from the sam e weapon. Connecting 
the proveniences of recovered cases, they were able to trace the 
m ovem ents of individual soldiers across the  battlefield.
Iconography
Archaeologists frequently use iconography w hen interpreting the 
past. These sources, for example, m ay depict “artifacts in  toto..., in 
functional contexts, or in action (Vend 1984: 126).” The artistic 
represen tation  of w ar no t only provides evidence for its outright 
existence, b u t also on how the w ars were fought. Recovered s ta tu e tte s  
an d  pain ted  ceram ics from the Moche of Peru (c. 200 BC to 600 AD), for 
example, depict w arriors with battle clubs an d  shields in addition to 
ac tu a l battle scenes. In addition, Fagan h as  in terpreted  Moche 
pain tings of h u m an  sacrifice as plausible evidence for the execution of 
p risoners of w ar (Fagan 1989).
Iconographic source m aterial from historic tim es no t only include 
artistic  represen tation  b u t also photography. D uring the Civil War, for 
example, the arm ies of both the Union an d  Confederacy were 
accom panied by new spaper a rtis ts  and  professional photographers to
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cap tu re cam p life and  com bat on paper and  film. Photographs from th is 
war, the first m ajor w ar cap tured  on film, provide archaeologists a  
unique window to glimpse the past. They m ay also have practical field 
applications. Jam es Deetz, for example, used  a  M atthew Brady 
photograph of a  Union pontoon bridge to locate the precise location of 
the bridge a t Flowerdew H undred. Using a  large cypress tree in the photo 
as a  sta rtin g  point, Deetz w as able to locate an  identical tree on the 
banks of the river and  geographically plot the exact location of the bridge 
(Deetz 1993).
As V end notes, however, there are several d isadvantages to the use  
of iconography including “their (relative) scarcity  and  irregularity of 
spatio-tem poral occurrence (Vend 1984: 126).” In addition, iconographic 
sources m ay depict models, fashions, m yths, or ideals (to glorify a 
w arrior or king, for example) ra th e r th an  ac tu a l historical events.
B azant ((1981) cited in V end  1984) h as  shown, for example, th a t w ar 
scenes on A thenian pots actually  declined w hen A thens w ent to war. 
Even photographs are subject to the whim s of the  photographer whose 
allegiance m ay have been w ith one side or the other. Photographers may 
also have sought to over-dram atize or mythologize the  events and  people 
they cap tu red  on film.
Warriors* Graves
W arriors’ graves constitu te  a  th ird  source of physical evidence 
because they often contain  w eapons or o ther m ilitary artifacts possessed 
by individual soldiers. The Anyang graves of the S hang  dynasty  in C hina 
(c. 3500 to 3100 BP), for example, have produced hordes of bows, arrows, 
knives, and  o ther w eapons. Archaeologists have even excavated the
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rem ains of w ar chario ts and  the horses used  to draw  them  (Kieman and  
Fairbank 1974). Thus, w arriors’ graves have produced a  great deal of the 
inform ation we now know abou t ancien t weaponry.
Grave sites, however, are not limited to the prehistoric.
Excavations a t a  hosp ital cem etery for the 55 th  M assachusetts 
V olunteer Infantry on Folly Island, S ou th  Carolina, for example, 
produced a  variety of m ilitary artifacts including bu ttons, buckles, bits of 
clothing, regim ental insignia, an d  others. Excavation of the 18 hum an  
burials in the cem etery enabled the archaeologists to reconstruc t the 
sam ple’s dem ographics an d  learn som ething of burial procedures a t 
Union arm y hospitals (Smith 1993).
Despite the ir obvious im portance, however, Vencl cau tions th a t 
w arriors’ graves “always represen t no more th an  a  fraction of the num ber 
of w arriors killed (Vencl 1984: 127).” In addition, the practice of placing 
grave goods in the tom bs of dead soldiers w as limited in time and  space. 
We are also limited by the fact th a t artifacts deteriorate in the 
archaeological environm ent. As a  result, it is no t always possible to 
determ ine if the recovered artifacts represen t even a  sm all portion of the 
to tal buried assem blage. We m u st also recognize th a t the privilege of 
burying dead w arriors m ay have been limited to the victors; defeated 
arm ies m ay no t have h ad  the option of collecting their dead from the 
battlefield (Vencl 1984).
This s ituation  may be com pounded by the fact th a t dead soldiers 
were often buried on the battlefield and  later exhum ed for reburial 
elsewhere, as in a  national cemetery. The dead of the  Seventh US 
Cavalry a t the Little Big Horn, for example, were exhum ed from shallow  
battlefield graves before reburial in a  m ass grave (Scott et. al. 1989; Fox 
1993). At Folly Island, 16 of the burials were m issing bones including
21
skulls; th is led the archaeologists to conclude th a t the reburial parties 
were less th a n  m eticulous in their du ties (Smith 1993).
Lethal W ounds
Bio-archaeological evidence in the form of cu ts  or gashes on 
recovered skeletons provide additional inform ation on arm ed conflict 
including likely cause of death . Blakely and  M athews (1990), for 
example, have used  skeletal rem ains to in terp ret ac ts  of w ar between the 
S pan ish  and  Native A m ericans in the American sou theast. Like the 
o ther types of evidence, however, skeletal rem ains are lim ited in time and  
space. They suffer deterioration in the  archaeological environm ent and  
do no t reflect w ounds to the flesh. Furtherm ore, the  archaeologist m ust 
recognize th a t w ounds m ay be inflicted by accident, as  pun ishm ent, or 
p art of a  ritua l and  are no t necessarily  the resu lt of an  arm ed 
confrontation (Vencl 1984).
Skeletal evidence for disease, however, m ay also be in terpreted as 
evidence of war. More th a n  h a lf  the casualties in the  Civil War, for 
example, were the resu lt of contagious diseases sp read  in overcrowded 
cam ps and  prisons ra th e r th a n  battlefield w ounds (McPherson 1988).
The archaeologist then  m u st always be aware of the possibility th a t 
skeletal evidence for d isease m ay be related to warfare.
Fortifications
Fortifications (earthw orks, forts, abatises, ram parts , obstacles, 
etc.) collectively form a  fifth class of physical evidence and  probably the 
m ost com mon in the  study  of war. Traditionally, archaeologists have
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dealt w ith fortifications as  defensive stru c tu res . As Vencl notes, 
however:
Textual references since classical an tiqu ity  bear o u t...th a t 
fortified cam ps as refugees for troops on the m arch were 
erected in the  course of m ilitary operations an d  transfers. 
Alternatively, ground fortifications on hilltops could have 
been p u t u p  in h aste  by retreating  troops or troops 
confronted with an  enem y superior in num bers. For th is 
reason, a  certain  segm ent of...fortifications could be 
assum ed  to have had  tactical significance (Vencl 1984: 128).
T hat m ost fortifications were designed for defensive purposes is no t in 
doubt. However, th is should  never be assum ed. Even those built 
strictly  for the defense could effectively function in offensive operations 
by im peding the enem y’s advance, providing protection to engaged 
troops, or used  as a  staging area.
Fortifications, however, are lim ited in tim e and  space. Im prom ptu 
or mobile fortifications (such as wagons or sandbags) m ay leave no trace 
in the  archaeological record. In addition, fortifications m ay have had  
several occupations by different com batan ts (indeed, they m ay change 
h an d s in the  sam e battle) th u s  obliterating or mixing the evidence from 
different occupations (Vencl 1984).
Landscapes
The study  of historic landscapes is a  fairly new sub-discipline in 
h istorical archaeology. Landscape in terpretation , however, can provide a  
great deal of inform ation on spa tia l pattern ing , land  use, and  ideology. 
Deetz h as  defined landscape as “the to ta l te rrestria l context in which 
archaeological s tudy  is p u rsu ed ” an d  cu ltu ra l landscape as “th a t p art of 
the  te rra in  which is modified according to a  se t of cu ltu ra l p lans (Deetz 
1990: 2).” Battlefields fall in the purview of cu ltu ra l landscape because
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they were modified by the m ilitaiy operations th a t took place in the field. 
N atural terrain  features on the battlefield m u st also be considered part 
of the cu ltu ra l landscape even if they were no t modified by direct hum an  
action. This is so because terrain  features su ch  as hilltops or valleys 
m ay have had  tactical significance. A river, for example, m ay limit 
avenues of approach or obstruct attack ing  or retreating forces.
Battlefields are particularly  am enable to landscape analysis 
because of the em phasis on space. Unlike o ther types of archaeological 
sites such  as hom elots, battlefields w itnessed in tense occupation spread  
across space in a  relatively sh o rt span  of time. Given the sho rt du ration  
of the occupation, well developed stratig raphy  is unlikely. Rather, it is 
the horizontal an d  no t the vertical d im ension th a t is m ost im portan t to 
the  analysis. In the ir s tudy  of the  Battle of the Little Big Horn, for 
example, Scott et. al. (1989) an d  Fox (1993) traced  the ebb and  flow of 
the battle by conducting a  spatial analysis of the  recovered artifacts. 
U nderstanding  the cu ltu ra l landscape th en  is the key to interpreting the 
past.
H istorical Archaeology and th e  Study o f  War
H istorical archaeologists are in a un ique position to s tudy  battles 
an d  w ars due to the ir access to docum ents which provide background 
and  contextual inform ation. Unlike h isto rians, who rely solely on 
docum ents, or prehistorians, who rely solely on m aterial culture, 
historical archaeologists have two bodies of d a ta  from which to in terpret 
the past. Furtherm ore, historical archeologists frequently have the 
advantage of knowing where historic battles were fought. This gives 
them  the opportun ity  to te s t for pattern ing  on the battlefield itself. The
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com bination of docum entary and  archaeological resources, should
enable the  archaeologist to:
identify specific relationships between certain  kinds of 
behavior u n d er the stress of w ar an d  the characteristic 
m aterial by-products of th a t behavior in the ir final 
(archaeological) context of d iscard  (Gould 1983: 134).
D ocum entary analysis is a  m ajor com ponent of th is  type of
research  in the construction  of context. B eaudry et. al. (1991), for
example, argue th a t  context is fundam ental to our understand ing  of the
p as t because it provides the background to our perception of meaning.
Context, they suggest:
...is where m eaning is located an d  constitu ted  an d  provides 
the key to its in terpretation . Recoveiy of m eaning is 
predicated on recoveiy of context because context no t only 
fram es m eaning by tying it to ac tua l situa tions and  events, 
b u t it is inextricably bound  u p  w ith m eaning. The existence 
of a  context implies the  presence of m eanings functioning 
w ithin it, an d  conversely, m eanings canno t exist in the 
absence of context (Beaudiy et. al. 1991: 160).
In o ther words, in order to recover m eaning in the archaeological record, 
one m u st s itu a te  it in a  cu ltu ra l context th a t can  only be derived from 
docum entary research.
To th is  end, Scott et. al. (1989) an d  Fox (1993) have developed a  
model for testing  artifact pattern ing  on historic battlefields called the 
stab ility /d isin tegration  model. The model assu m es th a t if you can  
predict the type or types of deploym ent form ations an  effective com bat 
u n it is likely to use (derived from com bat an d  o ther m ilitary m anuals), 
you should  be able to determ ine if the u n it deployed tactically on the 
basis of the m aterial cu ltu re (particularly arm am ents) left behind. The 
m odel w as tested  a t the  B attle of the Little Big Horn in M ontana with 
spectacu lar results.
On Ju n e  25th , 1876, L ieutenant Colonel George A rm strong C uster
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led a  force of 225 cavalrymen against an  estim ated 2,000 to 4,000 Native 
Am ericans (mostly Sioux and  Cheyenne) on the b anks of the Little Big 
Horn River. All 225, including C uster, were killed in action. As a  resu lt 
there h as  been some confusion and  m uch controversy over w hat actually 
happened  on the  battlefield. Some h isto rians have argued th a t C uster 
an d  h is m en fought a  desperate battle to the veiy end m aking a  gallant 
la st s tan d  despite the  odds in men. O thers have argued th a t they 
panicked in the  face of the odds resulting  in a  breakdow n in com m and 
and  the  loss of their effectiveness a s  a  fighting com bat unit. Using the 
archaeological evidence as a  d a ta  base, Scott an d  Fox attem pted  to 
model troop positions and  m ovement during  the  course of the battle by 
m apping recovered cartridge cases, bullets, and  battlefield m arkers which 
reportedly m arked the  exact spot where each soldier fell. W hat they 
found w as th a t C uster initially deployed tactically b u t h is m en began 
runn ing  off in erratic directions an d  to undefensible positions, som e even 
climbing into a  depression. Had they fought effectively, all deploym ents 
would have been tactical (as in skirm ish lines) and  all m ovem ent a s  a  
u n it to defensible positions. This confirm ed a  breakdow n in com m and 
and  suggested the rapid  spread  of panic th roughou t the un it (Scott et. al. 
1989; Fox 1993).
Conclusions
B ecause w ar is a  unique aspect of the to ta l hum an  experience, it
deserves the atten tion  of archaeology. As Fox notes:
War, though  hardly a  credit to hum anity , is a  distinctly 
h u m an  enterprise. Com bat behavior is, from the 
archaeological perspective, no more an d  no less susceptible 
to analyses th a n  any o ther form of hu m an  endeavor.
Battlefields, the theatres for war, rep resen t the sites a t 
which arm ed adversaries engaged in com bat. Arm am ents--
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w eapons and  equipm ent--are the im plem ents of war and  few 
battles have been fought w ithout them  (Fox 1993: 5).
Archaeology th u s  provides a  unique opportunity  to explore war through 
the m aterial cu ltu re  it leaves behind.
In th is chapter, I have d iscussed  som e of the m ethodologies and  
types of evidence archaeologists u se  to in terp ret war. Although I have 
divided them  into seven different categories (weapons, iconography, 
w arriors’ graves, le thal w ounds, fortifications, landscapes, and  
docum entation), they are all m utually  dependent and  inter-related. Any 
assessm en t of a  battlefield shou ld  consider all the evidence in toto. Any 
contradictions or gaps in the record--if we have w ounds an d  graves, for 
example, b u t no w eapons--should  be explored an d  explained. Finally, 
battlefield archaeologists m u s t em phasize the spatial dim ension in their 
analyses. The reconstruction  of the  cu ltu ra l landscape is a  crucial 
elem ent in determ ining w hat we can  learn  from an archaeology of the 
battlefield.
C h a p te r  3:
Significance:
W ithin th ree weeks of the  Battle of Gettysburg, efforts to preserve 
the battlefield a s  a  symbol of valor and  victoiy began in earnest. The 
National Cemetery, conceived as a  tribu te  to the Union dead, was 
com pleted in less th a n  a  year from the conclusion of the  battle. B ut 
ap a rt from a  m em orial cemetery, “some people w anted  the battlefield 
itself to serve as a  perm anen t memorial to the heroism  of the Union 
troops and  the righ teousness of their cause (Linenthal 1991: 89).” The 
battlefield w as recognized a t once as  a  powerful sym bol to a  nation  
struggling to m ain ta in  its existence an d  define its identity.
As the above exam ple suggests, battlefields frequently enjoy broad 
support as  significant historic an d  cu ltu ra l sites. Indeed, they are often 
elevated to the  s ta tu s  of sym bols to express cu ltu ra l or political 
sentim ents. By the 1880’s, for example, G ettysburg w as transform ed 
into a  symbol of reconciliation, based on the  restoration  of w hite rule in 
the sou th , as  p a rt of a  national movement to heal the w ounds of war. 
The question of slavery w as conveniently forgotten and  African- 
Am ericans were excluded from participation in the symbol. At o ther 
tim es, G ettysburg h as  been likened to a symbol of s ta te ’s rights, the 
valor of the American soldier, an d  even world peace (Linenthal 1991).
The power of battlefields as  sym bols h as  led h isto rian  David 
L inenthal (1991) to describe them  as America’s holy ground. He notes, 
for example, the frequency w ith which battlefields are described in 
religious term s. An 1886 G ettysburg guidebook, for example, described
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the battlefield as  “consecrated” ground and  likened it to Calvary, the site
of the  crucifixion of J e su s  C hrist in C hristian  trad ition  (Linenthal 1991:
4). S uch  imagery highlights the ideals of sacrifice an d  du ty  expected
from m en in arm s in service of the nation.
Battlefields also function as symbols of veneration  to the m odem
state . As S ilberm an notes:
Across a  m odem  landscape of carefully excavated and  
preserved to u ris t attractions, pride in ones nation , as  well as 
the hidden takens-for-granted of m odem  society--concepts of 
ethnicity, gender, work, identity, an d  efficiency--are m ade to 
seem  tim eless and  therefore inevitable. It is little w onder 
then  th a t the m odem  n a tio n ’s archaeological an d  historical 
sh rines are m ost often those th a t reflect technological 
progress, cu ltu ra l dom inance, or battlefield victories--the 
basic asp ira tions of the  m odem  sta te  (Silberm an (1993: 1-2).
The battlefield is the ideal symbol because it em bodies each of these
asp ira tions sim ultaneously. Victory symbolizes cu ltu ra l dom inance over
a  vanquished foe an d  technology typically plays a  role in the outcom e of
battle. The battlefield, a s  the  site of an  historic event, recalls the
sacrifice of a  n a tio n ’s forbears an d  therefore legitim ates dom inant
ideologies. Clearly, battlefields play an  integral role in shap ing  the
patriotic rhetoric of a  nation .
Yet the symbolic m eanings of battlefields are often contested by
m arginalized peoples who a ttach  a  different significance to the battle. In
the 1970’s, for example, representatives of the Am erican Indian
Movement (AIM), staged a  direct challenge to the popular m yth of George
C uster as  an  American patrio t and  the savior of the west. Led by Russel
M eans, AIM held pro tests a t the  Little Big Horn an d  placed their own
m em orial on the battlefield. The battlefield provided an  ideal symbolic
se tting  to poin t ou t contradictions in dom inant ideologies and  to argue
for a  different in terpretation  of histoiy. As L inenthal notes:
...battlefields are civil spaces where Am ericans of various 
ideological persuasions come, not always reverently, to
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com pete for the ow nership of powerful national stories and  
to argue abou t the n a tu re  of heroism , the m eaning of war, 
the  efficacy of m artia l sacrifice, and  the  significance of 
preserving the  patriotic landscape of the nation  (Linenthal 
1991:1).
Yet despite their obvious historical and  cu ltu ra l significance, 
archaeologists have largely failed to define the  archaeological 
significance of battlefields. The rem ainder of th is  chap ter d iscusses the 
concept of significance in archaeology and  its im plications for 
archaeology on the battlefield.
Significance
Archaeological significance is m ost often defined in term s of the 
eligibility criteria for nom ination  to the National Register of Historic 
Places. The Historic Site Preservation Act of 1966 defines as significant 
those sites...
(1) th a t are associated  w ith events th a t have m ade a  
significant contribu tion  to the broad p a tte rn s  of ou r history; 
or
(2) th a t are associated  w ith the lives of persons significant 
in our past; or
(3) th a t em body the distinctive characteristics of a  type, 
period, m ethod of construction , or th a t represen t the work 
of a  m aster, or th a t possess high artistic  values, or th a t 
represen t a  significant and  distinguishable entity  whose 
com ponents m ay lack individual distinction; or
(4) th a t have yielded, or m ay be likely to yield, im portan t 
inform ation in prehistory  or history  (quoted in Schiffer and  
G um erm an 1977).
This legal definition, an d  its enabling legislation, virtually created  the 
field of cu ltu ra l resource m anagem ent in archaeology. It is not, however, 
the  only definition.
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As Schiffer and  G um erm an (1977) note, archaeological significance 
m ay be defined by a variety of criteria th a t m ay or may not overlap with 
the legal definition. S ites capable of producing the d a ta  to answ er 
specific research  questions, for example, possess scientific significance; 
sites associated w ith or im portan t to a  particu lar ethnic group possess 
ethnic significance; an d  sites useful in the education  of the public or 
th a t prom ote local economy through  tourism  possess public significance 
(Schiffer an d  G um erm an 1977). Furtherm ore, the  determ ination of 
significance m ay be m ade a t the  national, s ta te , or local level (King et. 
al. 1977). A battlefield su ch  as W illiamsburg, for example, m ay possess 
significance for local or regional history, b u t no t to the  nation  a t  large.
Marley Brown h as suggested th a t significance be determ ined on 
the basis of potential inform ation loss. If we are likely to loose 
inform ation by no t excavating a  site (or by extension no t preserving it), 
then  it possess significance (Deetz 1993). In sum , the  definition of 
significance m ay be based  on a  variety of broad perspectives an d  different 
criteria.
Despite the diversity, however, archaeologists have generally agreed
th a t significant sites m u st possess integrity regardless of any o ther
criteria applied to the site. The National Register criteria, for example,
stipu late  tha t:
the quality  of significance...is p resen t in d istricts, sites, 
buildings, s tru c tu res, and  objects...that possess integrity of 
location, design, setting, m aterials, w orkm anship, feeling, 
and  association (36 CFR 60.0, quoted in King et. al. 1977:
97; em phasis added).
This appears fairly straightforw ard on the surface. A site w ith integrity 
possesses spa tia l and  associational contexts th a t have not been 
com promised. Yet in practice, the concept of integrity is ju s t  as  broad as 
the o ther significance criteria.
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As King et. al. note, “the  integrity criterion h as  m eaning only as it 
in teracts w ith the more specific criteria upon which the significance of 
the property is judged (King et, al. 1977: 97).” They suggest th a t the 
definition of integrity is inexplicably tied to the specific research 
questions an  archaeologist ask s of a  property. By way of example, they 
argue th a t an  Early W oodland sca tte r of stone tools and  flakes, 
thoroughly mixed by plowing, h as  integrity despite the mixing if the 
research  questions focus on “local stone working techn iques” or 
“p a tte rn s  of regional trad e .” In these instances, detailed contextual 
inform ation is no t required to complete the s tu d y  (King et. al.1977).
Given the broad variety in all possible definitions of significance, 
any  battlefield could potentially be ruled significant. Battles, for 
example, are often associated  with im portan t historic persons, relevant 
to broad p a tte rn s  of history, and  enjoy public support. Consider, for 
example, the num ber of battlefields preserved a t the  sta te  and  national 
levels. Even sm all sk irm ish  sites are frequently relevant to local history. 
The key question in determ ining a  specific battlefield’s  archaeological 
significance, however, hinges on the concept of integrity. How one 
defines integrity with respect to the research  questions asked  of a  battle 
site will determ ine the  in terpretation  of significance.
Battlefields have largely been overlooked by archaeologists for 
several reasons. They are routinely dism issed as archaeological sites 
because the behavioral activity th a t took place on the site occurred in a 
sh o rt sp an  of time. Archaeologists typically deal w ith sites, su ch  as 
hom elots or encam pm ents, th a t are occupied for considerably longer 
periods of time. As a  result, it is assum ed  th a t no m eaningful 
stratig raphy  could be produced on the site. Furtherm ore, it is often 
argued th a t looting activity by relic h u n te rs  h as  destroyed any
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associational context am ong artifacts th a t m ay or m ay no t have existed
in the first place. Excavation then  becomes an  exercise in curiosity an d
battlefields have no significance outside the fact th a t  a  battle once took
place. As Noel Hum e notes:
Little can  usefully be said abou t battlefield sites. If one side 
h ad  time to dig in, we m ay be left w ith the rem ains of 
fortifications...; if not, the  site will have little to d istinguish  
it, except perhaps som e graves and  a  sca tte r of hardw are th a t 
can best be salvaged by using a  m etal detector. There can be 
no m eaningful stra tig raphy  (as far as  the battle  is 
concerned), and  the  salvage of relics becom es the be all and  
end all (Noel Hum e 1975: 188).
In sum , battlefields canno t be studied  productively because they lack 
integrity.
This is certainly  a  fair s ta tem en t if one evaluates battlefields in the 
sam e way as  o ther types of archaeological sites, su ch  as domestic 
occupations or long term  m ilitary encam pm ents. Battlefields, however, 
are a  un ique site type. The sh o rt duration  of battle  activity provides the 
archaeologist the rare  opportunity  to in terpret p as t behavior in a  short 
spam of time. W hereas o ther types of site are occupied for years or 
decades, a  battlefield provides the  archaeologist a  tigh t date range for the 
site (Barka, personal com m unication 1995). Furtherm ore, research 
designs th a t only em phasize the recovery of artifacts are inadequate. 
W hen battlefield sites are conceptualized as no th ing  more th a n  
depositories of m ilitary hardw are, as Noel Hum e (1975) suggests, then  no 
m eaningful pa ttern ing  of finds can be expected to exist. B ut w hen the 
battlefield is conceptualized as a  cu ltu ra l landscape, a  clearer p icture of 
contex tual relationships begins to emerge .
As Deetz (1990) notes, of the th ree archaeological d im ensions-- 
space, time, an d  form --space h as  not always been given its due. He 
suggests a t least two reasons for why th is is so. On the one hand , space
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is neglected “where there is no visible sign of h u m an  activity” such  as a 
house or fortification. The key word is visible  for landscapes are often 
used  or modified in subtle  ways. With respect to battlefields, one m ight 
pay particu lar a tten tion  to te rra in  features. Valleys, hilltops, fields, and  
other geographic features are tactically significant a ttrib u tes  of the 
battlefield. Indeed, the decision to fight a  battle a t a  given tim e and  
place is often based  on terrain . The fighting on the  first day of 
Gettysburg, for example, w as tactically designed to enable the Union 
arm y time to occupy the  high ground to the so u th  of town (McPherson 
1988).
On the o ther hand , the neglect of landscape is the resu lt of scale. 
Landscapes can be enorm ous and  as Deetz notes, “they lack the specific 
locational focus of the more u su a l archaeological features (Deetz 1990: 
2).” The 1942 G erm an-R ussian front during World W ar II, for example, 
stre tched  from Finland to the Black Sea. S uch  im m ense m ilitaiy 
landscapes are difficult to com prehend let alone study  archaeologically. 
To be sure, m ost battlefields were not quite so m onstrous; b u t the notion 
of scale does beg the  question: how do we define battlefield landscapes. 
Do battlefields include, for example, areas occupied by troops on line bu t 
no t actually  engaged or troops in reserve. This is no t simply a  trivial 
question  for how we define the battlefield landscape h a s  direct 
im plications for o u r definitions of integrity an d  significance.
W ebster defines the battlefield as  “a  place where a  battle  is fought 
(M erriam-W ebster dictionary 1974).” Though straightforw ard and  simple, 
th is  is an  inadequate definition for the archaeologist for the reasons 
discussed  above. W hen the battlefield is conceptualized as  a  d istinct 
locational entity  where com bat took place, then  the  recovery of battle- 
related artifacts becom es the  focus of the  research. Rather, the
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battlefield m ust be recognized a s  a  tactically significant, cu ltu ra l 
landscape. How and  where arm ies draw  their lines of battle is ju s t  as 
im portan t a s  the battle (read fighting) itself. R econstructing the battle 
landscape, w ith em phasis on modified or unm odified terra in  features, 
im prom ptu or perm anen t fortifications, an d  the definition of avenues of 
approach  is ju s t  as significant as  the recovery of artifacts.
Landscape analyses acquire more m eaning when com bined with 
the resu lts  of artifact recovery. Scott et. al. (1989) an d  Fox (1993), for 
example, were able to isolate fighting positions an d  plot troop movem ent 
across the Little Big Horn Battlefield by defining artifact pattern ing  
th rough  space, i.e., across the landscape. Recovered shell casings and  
bullets were piece plotted enabling them  to trace the ebb an d  flow of the 
battle. Furtherm ore, they included an  analysis of te rra in  features in 
the ir in terp reta tions again reinforcing the im portance of te rra in  in 
m ilitary operations.
These stud ies are relevant in a t least two ways. On the  one hand, 
they define the battlefield as  a  cu ltu ra l landscape; space is the key factor 
in the  analysis. On the  o ther hand , they dem onstrate  th a t  artifact 
pattern ing  m ay exist on a  battlefield. Recall th a t one of the m ajor 
argum ents against archaeology on the battlefield is th a t  artifacts will be 
low in num ber and  probably disturbed. As these resu lts  suggest, th is 
should  never again be assum ed.
The definition of integrity th en  m u st include space as a  key 
variable an d  recognize the battlefield as a  cu ltu ra l landscape. Research 
designs th a t over-em phasize the recoveiy of artifacts or m aterial cu lture 
stud ies are inadequate to the  task . The battlefield, regardless of its size, 
m u st be conceptualized as a  whole. This is particularly  relevant for 
cu ltu ra l resource m anagem ent projects th a t are lim ited in scope by
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contract. Evaluations of integrity, and  by extension significance, m u st 
take into accoun t those sections of the battlefield outside the  project 
area. Should  p a tte rn s  fail to emerge, one m u st ask  if th is  is so because 
the pattern ing  does no t exist or because an  insufficient a rea  h as  been 
tested. If the  possibility exists th a t more m eaningful resu lts  could be 
obtained  by testing a  larger area, then  the area  tested  should  not be 
ru led  insignificant.
It is here suggested th a t the m ost productive way to approach  an  
archaeology of the  battlefield, is to divide it into m anageable s tu d y  un its , 
called episodes, th a t correspond to various battle  events (Fox 1993).
E ach episode includes th a t p art of the to tal battle landscape related to 
an  event su ch  as the building of fortifications or a  p articu lar skirm ish. 
All episodes m u st be understood  as a  p art of the whole and  related to the 
battlefield in toto. Episodes m ay overlap, a  fortification m ay be occupied 
during  a  skirm ish for example, b u t each episode is un ique to the 
particu lar event w ith which it corresponds. This provides the 
archaeologist a  m eans to sort th rough  various battle events w ithout 
losing track  of the whole.
Furtherm ore, the concept of the  episode allows the archaeologist 
to evaluate integrity and  significance in sm aller un its . While the 
integrity of one episode m ay be com prom ised by development or some 
o ther d istu rbance, evidence of o ther episodes m ay rem ain in tact. This in 
no way eases the problem of moving beyond the im m ediate project area, 
b u t it allows the archaeologist to th in k  in conceptual increm ents: one 
m ay assess, for example, how the im m ediate project area  relates to the 
episode or episodes of which it is part, an d  then  how those episodes 
relate to the battlefield as  a  whole.
This moves u s  to the question  of methodology. If the  goal of the
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project is to u n d ers tan d  the battlefield a s  a  cu ltu ra l landscape, then  the 
archaeologist m u st maximize the collection of spa tia l data. Shovel 
testing is an  inadequate recoveiy strategy because it does not produce 
the detailed spa tia l d a ta  needed to reconstruc t battle  events. Rather, 
battlefields m u st be sw ept w ith m etal detectors an d  recovered artifacts 
piece plotted in order to identify spa tia l pattern ing  in the finds. This is 
no t to reject sam pling strategies outright; rather, the  sam pling should  
be based on a  m etal detector survey ra th e r th a n  shovel testing alone.
The archaeologist will th en  be in a  better position to evaluate a  battle 
site’s integrity an d  significance. Failure to incorporate an  adequate 
research design m ay lead to an  im proper determ ination of insignificant.
Finally, the archaeologist m u st recognize public in terest in  the 
site. Because battlefields enjoy broad public support, round  tables or 
o ther historic societies often have preservation goals. The archaeologist 
may use  the su p p o rt of these in stitu tio n s or o ther in terested  citizeniy to 
bolster determ inations of significance. In re tu rn , these  groups m ay 
benefit from archaeology in their preservation efforts. Describing an  
historic property as a  significant archaeological site in addition to an  
historical a n d /o r  cu ltu ra l site, m ay ass is t in their preservationist goals. 
The archaeologist m u st be waiy, however, of u n sc ru p u lo u s looters 
associated with these  groups. If honorable individuals can  be identified, 
they should  be encouraged to identify looter’s in the  m em bership. 
Furtherm ore, groups can  be educated  on the  detrim ents of th is type of 
site destruction .
To sum m arize, the significance of battle  sites shou ld  always be 
based on an  u n derstand ing  of the battlefield as  a  cu ltu ra l landscape. 
E m phasis m u st be placed on a  detailed description an d  spatial analysis 
of battle  features, including terra in  features, to m ake in terpretations
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m eaningful. Evaluations of integrity m u st be based on adequate recoveiy 
strategies. The concept of the  episode provides the archaeologist a  
m eans of dividing the to ta l landscape into m anageable, b u t related parts. 
Finally, the archaeologist m u st recognize th a t the public m ay also have 
an  in te rest in the site.
C h a p te r  4:
The Battle for W illiam sburg
After discovering the rebel re trea t from Yorktown, McClellan 
ordered h is cavaliy u n d er G eneral George S tonem an and  four batteries in 
pu rsu it. S tonem an, who w as prom ised infantry  support from G eneral 
Hooker should  he m ake contact, m anaged to catch  the Confederate rear 
guard  ju s t  outside the W illiamsburg defenses on the evening of May 4th. 
He engaged Confederate pickets eight miles o u t of Yorktown and  the 
Fourth  Virginia Cavalry (see Appendix A, U nits Engaged a t Williamsburg) 
u nder L ieutenant W.C. W ickman two miles further. A Union battery  
u n d er Philip St. George Cooke (J.E.B. S tu a r t’s father-in-law), however, 
forced W ickman to retreat. At th is point the Confederate defenses were 
still empty, the bu lk  of the arm y having already passed  W illiamsburg, 
and  a  race ensued  to take the forts. G eneral Jo h n sto n , com m anding 
from W illiamsburg, ordered a  brigade u nder G eneral Paul J . Sem m es to 
occupy Fort M agruder and  Sem m es beat Cooke to the prize. Sem m es was 
soon joined by a  second brigade u n d er G eneral Lafayette McClaws who 
took com m and of the  operation. McClaws ordered one gun each into the 
redoubts on h is right (Redoubts 1 th rough  5) an d  a  brigade under J.B. 
Kershaw to secure h is left flank. After brief skirm ishing in front of 
Redoubts 7 and  8, however, S tonem an ordered a  w ithdraw al w hen his 
infantry  support failed to m aterialize (see figure 3).
G eneral Hooker, and  a second division u n d er General William F. 
Sm ith, were having difficulty moving their own troops an d  artilleiy 
across the soggy, m uddy roads and  coping with obstacles left in the wake
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Figure 3. The W illiam sburg Line, May 4th , 1862 (Kettenburg 1980).
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of the Confederate army. In addition, both  divisions were tied up  in a 
traffic jam  w hen they crossed the sam e roads. In the  end, Sm ith 
approached W illiamsburg from the Union right (Yorktown Road) and  
Hooker from the left (Ham pton Road). Neither division, however, w as 
able to reach S tonem an during  daylight ho u rs (Kettenburg 1980; OR, XI, 
Pt. 1).
Sm ith  finally arrived a t the defenses a ro u n d  nightfall along with 
G eneral Edwin V. Sum ner, the Second Corps Com m ander, ordered to 
take charge of the operation by G eneral McClellan. S um ner ordered 
Sm ith’s division to advance b u t the  u n its  becam e tangled in thick 
u n d erb ru sh  an d  lost direction in  the dark. By eight o’clock, in to tal 
darkness and  rain, the advance w as stopped. S um ner him self got lost in 
the woods on a  m ission to reconnoiter the rebel works. In the m eantim e, 
General Hooker m ade cam p on the H am pton Road some three miles 
so u th east of W illiam sburg .
D uring the night, Jo h n s to n  ordered Longstreet to replace McClaws 
in the defenses. Longstreet placed his second brigade u n d er Richard A. 
A nderson and  his fifth u n d er Roger A. Piyor into the  fortified line. 
Jo h n sto n  ordered h is th ree rem aining corps, u n d er G enerals Magruder,
G.W. Sm ith, an d  D aniel H. Hill, to  continue the m arch  to Richmond. 
Due to delays, however, Hill w as forced to spend  the  n ight in 
W illiamsburg (Kettenburg 1980; OR, XI, Pt. 1; Longstreet 1960).
Hooker resum ed the m arch  early on the  m orning of May 5 th  and  
h ad  reached Fort M agruder by 5:30. Longstreet w as waiting. W hen the 
approaching Union colum n w as first detected, A nderson deployed the 
F ourth  S ou th  C arolina as sk irm ishers to coun ter the th rea t. In 
response, Hooker ordered the F irst M assachusetts  to the  left of H am pton 
road, an d  the Second New H am pshire to the right, a n d  drove the rebels
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back to the fortified position. He th en  placed a  battery  on the  H am pton 
Road an d  opened a  barrage on Fort M agruder. Rebel guns responded 
from th e  fort and  Redoubt 5 a s  sharpshoo ters  aim ed a t Union 
cannoneers (see figure 4).
By eight o’clock, Hooker began extending h is line to the right 
hoping to link up  w ith S um ner who he believed w as forming a  Union 
cen ter in front of Fort M agruder. The Eleventh M assachusetts, Twenty- 
S ixth Pennsylvania, and  Fifth New Jersey  were extended to the right of 
the  Second New H am pshire. The Sixth, Seventh, and  Eighth New Jersey  
were th en  deployed to the  left of the  F irst M assachusetts  to secure the 
flank. They were m et by the  N ineteenth M ississippi, E ighth, Ninth, and  
Tenth Alabam a, an d  F ourteen th  Louisiana (under the consolidated 
com m and of C adm us M. Wilcox) attack ing  the  extended Union line ju s t  
so u th  eas t of R edoubts 3, 4, an d  5 (see figure 5). Hooker th en  sen t the 
Seventy-Second New York to relieve the F irst M assachusetts  who were 
nearly  ou t of am m unition  (Kettenburg 1980; OR, XI, Pt. 1).
By eleven o’clock, neither side h ad  gained a  decisive advantage 
despite over five hours of h ard  fighting. Hooker sen t frequent requests to 
S um ner for reinforcem ents an d  urged the Third C orps’ Third Division, 
u n d er G eneral Philip Kearny, now moving up  the H am pton Road and  
tow ard the battle, to hu rry  along. Longstreet, in the m eantim e, ordered 
A nderson to bring the brigades of Wilcox and  G eneral Ambrose P. Hill 
into line of battle. Hill h ad  been waiting in reserve on the road between 
W illiamsburg an d  Fort M agruder w hen he received the order to advance. 
He organized the Seventh, Eleventh, Seventeenth, and  First Virginia 
Regim ents behind Redoubts 2 , 3 ,  an d  4 an d  advanced to the right of 
Wilcox for a  renewed attack . Hill w as supported  in the  rear by a  brigade 
of V irginians u n d er G eneral George Pickett. As the new  Confederate line
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pushed  forward, Hooker fell back (see figure 6). After ordering the 
Seventieth New York forward to relieve the Seventy-Second New York and  
New Jersey  brigades, Hooker threw  h is last rem aining reserve, the 
Seventy-Third and  Seventy-Forth New York, into line an d  shifted the 
E leventh M assachusetts  to the  Union left to relieve the  Second New 
York. The Sixth Pennsylvania w as also directed to shift left b u t never 
received the order. This left a  sm all gap in the  Union line an d  the rebels 
were quick to capitalize. S ou th  Carolina troops from Redoubt 6 charged 
the gap and  cap tured  four Union guns in the  process (see figure 7).
The rebels, however, were having difficulties of the ir own. As 
am m unition  ran  th in , Longstreet w as forced to call for reinforcem ents. 
D.H. Hill w as recalled from W illiam sburg an d  two of h is regim ents, the 
Second Florida and  Second M ississippi, deployed in line. Confusion 
reigned on the  battlefield. The th u n d e r of artillery and  m usketry  m ade 
com m unication difficult while sm oke and  rain  lim ited visibility and  
ham pered  mobility. Before the rebels could organize an  effective a ttack  
on the Union gap, Hooker stabilized h is line and  neither side could gain 
the advantage. All Hooker’s requests to S um ner for reinforcem ents were 
ignored despite the  fact th a t S m ith ’s  division w as no t engaged. Fearing 
an  a ttack  on the Union center, S um ner refused to w eaken h is  own line 
to sup p o rt Hooker. W ithout the  reinforcem ents, Hooker could only 
continue to fight to a  draw  (Kettenburg 1980; OR, XI, Pt. 1).
By one o’clock p.m ., however, Jo h n  J . Peck’s brigade from the First 
Division of the  F ourth  Corps reached Hooker along the Yorktown Road 
an d  deployed the One H undred-Second Pennsylvania to the  right and  
Fifty-Fifth an d  Sixty-Second New York to the left. In tending to provide 
Hooker som e relief by draw ing rebel troops from the engaged Confederate 
line, Peck only drew the a tten tion  of Sou th  Carolina troops from Fort
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M agruder. After a  strong counter-a ttack , Peck w as forced to strengthen  
h is own line w ith the Ninety-Third Pennsylvania an d  Hooker continued 
to fight w ithout relief or reinforcem ent (see figure 7).
By three o’clock, the Union line again showed signs of fatigue. 
A m m unition ran  low and  Hooker h ad  no additional reserve to move into 
line. W hen the Seventieth  New York finally exhausted  its am m unition, 
they were forced to retreat. Only the  timely arrival of G eneral Kearny 
enabled  Hooker to m ain ta in  the  line. Kearny deployed the Second and  
Fifth M ichigan and  Thirty-Seventh New York of the  Third Brigade to the 
left of H am pton Road an d  the  Thirty-Eighth an d  Fortieth  New York of 
the Second Brigade to the  right. He then  ordered the M ichigan regim ents 
forward an d  w atched as they p u sh ed  the rebels back  to the ir approxim ate 
s ta rtin g  point an d  recap tured  the  lost guns (see figure 8). Hooker and  
Longstreet would occupy these positions for the rem ainder of the battle 
(Kettenburg 1980; OR, XI, Pt. 1).
Elsewhere on the Union left, a ttem pts by Union cavalry to o u t­
flank the rebel defenses m et w ith little success. The Third Pennsylvania 
Cavalry m anaged to p u sh  as far a s  Redoubt 1 and  cavalry u n d er William
H. Emory tentatively advanced u p  a road th a t led to the Confederate 
rear. No advantage cam e of the m aneuvers, however, due to the lack of 
in fan tiy  support (Kettenburg 1980).
As action on the Union left ground to a  halt, it w as ju s t  beginning 
on the right. Throughout the  day, escaped slaves an d  con trabands 
entering Union lines provided intelligence th a t suggested Confederate 
redoub ts on the Union right were unoccupied. Additional 
reconnaissance proved th a t Redoubt 14, ju s t  across a  road over the Cub 
Creek Dam, w as indeed unoccupied. In response, S um ner ordered 
G eneral Winfield H ancock from S m ith ’s division w ith five infantry
C  00
m
Lo
c o
UJ
COw
w
F igu re  8. T he W illiam sb u rg  Line, M ay 5 th , 1862, 3 PM (K e tten b u rg
1980).
49
regim ents (the Fifth W isconsin, Forty-Ninth Pennsylvania, Thirty-Third 
New York, and  Sixth an d  Seventh Maine) and  a  New York battery  to 
occupy the redoubt. H ancock approached with caution, leery of the 
intelligence, an d  crossed the Cub Creek Dam  road in a ssau lt formation. 
Finding the redoubt empty, he also discovered th a t the Confederates had  
failed to occupy Redoubt 11. From there he could see clearly to Fort 
M agruder. He then  called for reinforcem ents in p reparation  for an  
a s sa u lt on the  Confederate left flank. All th a t arrived, however, were 
four guns who opened on Fort M agruder and  drew the a tten tion  of the 
rebel line. Confederate Colonel Micah Jenk ins, in com m and of Fort 
M agruder, reinforced R edoubts 9 and  10 w ith the S ixth S ou th  Carolina 
an d  H ancock refused to engage w ithout reinforcem ents (Kettenburg 1980; 
OR, XI, Pt. 1; Sears 1988; Tucker 1960).
By two o’clock, H ancock w as again requesting the  m en he believed 
necessary  to destroy the Confederate flank. Instead, S um ner ordered him  
back to Redoubt 14. Recognizing the strategic im portance of the 
position, however, H ancock refused to comply and  dispatched yet 
an o th er request for reinforcem ents along w ith a  description of his 
position. S um ner only repeated his original order. U ndaunted , Hancock 
held Redoubt 11 an d  continued  sending staff officers to S um ner’s 
headquarters to argue his case.
In the m eantim e, the  Confederate’s continued to streng then  the ir 
position. G eneral D.H. Hill, who heard  the initial volley of artillery fire, 
w as given perm ission by Longstreet to attack. Hill deployed h is First 
Brigade u n d er G eneral Ju b a l Early who m arched the Twenty-Fourth and  
Thirty-Eighth Virginia, an d  Twenty-Third and  Fifth North Carolina 
th rough  som e woods in the general direction of the  Union position. 
Neither Hill nor Early had  bothered to get any intelligence on the Union
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position and  were ignorant of its exact location and  strength . To m ake 
m atte rs  worse, they were traveling th rough  thick woods in the pouring 
rain. The form ation lost its  integrity, the  u n its  were separated , and  
com m unication broke down (Kettenburg 1980; OR, XI, Pt. 1; Tucker 
1960).
By five o’clock, H ancock h ad  no new word from S u m n er and  
grudgingly decided to w ithdraw  to Redoubt 14. J u s t  as  the  Union 
regim ents began quitting the ir position, however, Early em erged from the 
woods w ith the Tw enty-Fourth Virginia and  charged. The Fifth 
W isconsin immediately responded w ith fire as H ancock moved the 
brigade back to the crest of the  redoubt. The Fifth North Carolina also 
em erged from the woods and, m istaking the Union w ithdraw al to 
Redoubt 14 as a  re trea t ra th e r th an  a  redeploym ent, also charged. 
H ancock formed a  second line to repel the attack . The fire w as 
m urderous an d  the Confederates were forced to re trea t w hen Hancock 
ordered a  countercharge. The Twenty-Fourth Virginia, who had  already 
suffered heavy casualties, escaped back into the woods. The Fifth North 
Carolina, however, were no t quite so lucky. They h ad  charged too far 
from the safety of the woods to m ake a  timely re trea t an d  h ad  to cross 
back over an  open field to reach  the safety of the woods. Union volleys 
took three-fourths the ir to tal num ber. The Twenty-Third North Carolina 
an d  the Thirty-Eighth Virginia never m ade it to the  field to sup p o rt or 
partic ipate in the attack . H ancock refused to p ress the retreat, however, 
a s  he still lacked reinforcem ents. The battle took ju s t  over tw enty 
m inu tes (see figure 9) (OR, XI, Pt. 1; Tucker 1960).
Fighting cam e to a  com plete ha lt w ith nightfall an d  the  rebels 
w ithdrew  from the field to continue their m arch to Richm ond. Union 
casualties am ounted  to 2 ,283, the m ajority su sta in ed  by Hooker, and  the
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Figure 9. The Williamsburg Line, May 5th, 1862, 5 PM (Kettenburg
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Confederates lost 1,560, over one-th ird  in the charge on H ancock (see 
figure 10). McClellan proclaim ed a Union victory because they were left 
in position of the field and  occupied W illiamsburg. The Army of 
N orthern Virginia, however, despite abandoning  the battlefield, had  
accom plished the ir sole strategic objective: to fight long enough to enable 
the rest of the ir arm y to continue the  m arch  to Richmond. Furtherm ore, 
once the Confederate chain  of com m and had  decided to abandon  the 
pen in su la  altogether, the strategic im portance of W illiamsburg w as nil. 
McClellan w as left in possession of a  town Jo h n sto n  was leaving anyway. 
Given the  strategic success, victory seem s to belong to the Confederate 
arm y (Kettenburg 1980; Sears 1988).
A Comparison of Union and 
Confederate Casualties
■  Union Casualties 
§ 1  Confederate Casualties
Figure 10. A com parison of Union an d  Confederate casualties (after 
K ettenburg 1980).
C h a p te r  5:
A ssessing the Battlefield a t W illiam sburg
The W illiamsburg battlefield m akes an  in teresting case study  in 
battlefield archaeology for several reasons. Unlike m ajor Civil War 
battlefields, such  as G ettysburg an d  Antietam , the W illiamsburg 
Battlefield h as  no t been preserved an d  large sections have been destroyed 
by development. Furtherm ore, ow nership of the battlefield is divided 
am ong hom e owners, businesses, a  m useum , the National Park Service, 
an d  York County; th is  raises critical questions regarding the 
coordination of in tac t resources and  the  often touchy issue of property 
rights. Real esta te  divisions an d  sub-divisions infrequently take 
unpro tec ted  historic resources into consideration. This is particularly  
problem atic for the W illiam sburg battlefield because it s tre tches across 
th ree different com m unities: W illiamsburg, Jam es City County, and  York 
County.
There h as  also been a  great deal of looting a t sites associated  with 
the battlefield. Several of the  ex tan t redoubts are pocketed w ith looter’s 
p its an d  show  o ther signs of d istu rbance. This type of activity is 
exceeding difficult to control on unpro tected  sites. Land ow ners m ay be 
indifferent to relic hun tin g  on the ir property or no t even realize su ch  
activity is tak ing  place. Furtherm ore, Civil W ar relic collectors are 
typically very knowledgeable abou t battlefields and  know exactly where to 
look for m ilitary artifacts.
W illiam sburg is also hom e to an  active Civil War Round Table w ith 
a  p articu lar in te rest in the  battlefield. The Round Table h a s  recently
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erected a  m onum ent to the battlefield and  various m em bers have created 
the W illiam sburg Line Preservation Com mittee to m onitor construction  
activity on in tac t portions of the  battlefield an d  to organize a cam paign 
to acquire the battlefield for preservation. The com m ittee w as delighted 
to discover a n  archaeologist in terested  in the battlefield largely because 
they h ad  never considered it a s  an  archaeological site.
All these  factors merge w hen struggling w ith in terp reta tions of 
significance. The fieldwork for the project consisted  of isolating in tac t 
sections of the  battlefield th a t m ay contain  archaeological resources. 
A lthough no sub-surface testing or m etal detector surveys were 
conducted, the  goal w as to define those areas th a t have the potential of 
producing those resources, including artifacts, a rch itec tu ra l rem ains, or 
significant topographical features. This inform ation no t only begins to 
organize the archaeological resource database, b u t should  also prove 
useful in fu ture Resource Protection P lanning (RP3) for W illiamsburg, 
York County, an d  Jam es City C ounty (see Brown an d  Bragdon 1986) an d  
the preservation efforts of the W illiamsburg Line Preservation 
Com m ittee.
Episodes
The W illiam sburg battlefield m ay be divided into four m ajor 
episodes including the construction  of the defensive line by M agruder, 
the S tonem an engagem ent, the Hooker engagem ent, an d  the H ancock 
engagem ent (see figure 11). Each episode m ay then  be sub-divided for 
finer degrees of analysis. The construction  of each individual redoubt, 
for example, constitu tes a  sub-episode of the larger defensive line. The 
three m ain engagem ents m ay also be divided according to skirm ishes
A Summary of Battle Episodes
15 known 
defensive 
structures built in 
a three mile line of 
defense between  
the College and 
Q ueens Creeks
Union and 
Confederate 
forces engage  
outside Redoubts 
2, 3, 4, 5, and Fori 
6 on May 5, 1862
Union cavalry 
engage  
Confederate 
'infantry outside 
Redoubts 7 and 8 
on May 4, 1862
Union infantry 
occupy redoubts 14 
and 11 and repulse 
a Confederate 
counter-attack on 
May 5, 1862
The Stoneman 
engagement
The Hooker 
engagement
The Hancock 
engagement
Construction of the 
defensive line
Figure 11. A sum m ary of battle episodes.
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between the various divisions, brigades, and  regim ents engaged in the 
battle. The episode concept enables the researcher to divide the 
battlefield into m anageable study  u n its  w hen searching for in tac t 
portions of the battlefield. The division of the fortifications is the 
sim plest and  m ost logical division because they are relatively easy to 
define th rough  space. The concept is particularly  useful, however, w hen 
applied to the  engagem ents. Battlefields w itnessed in tense and  often 
confusing violent behavior. Each arm y moved and  parried  off the o ther 
tiy ing to achieve the decisive advantage. The concept of the episode 
allows the archaeologist to divide th a t behavior an d  the m aterial cu lture  
it left behind  into increasingly sm aller study  un its . The rem ainder of 
th is  chap ter focuses on the po ten tia l archaeological resources associated 
w ith each episode.
The D efensive Line
The location of 15 know n defensive struc tu res, in various s ta tes  of 
preservation, are recorded on the  Virginia D epartm ent of Historic 
Resource’s site survey (see figure 12 an d  Appendix B). These sites were 
rudim entally  surveyed in the early 1970’s. Fieldwork for th is  project 
consisted  of reinspecting the sites to assess  the po ten tia l of 
archaeological resources an d  to u pdate  the s ta te ’s files. All s tru c tu re s  
were photographed and  m apped in plan where feasible.
R edoubt 1
R edoubt 1 (44JC56), a  rem arkably preserved, five sided fort th a t 
anchored  the  Confederate right, is located on a  knoll ju s t  no rth  of
Iciiariestiwi
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Figure 12. Topographic m ap showing location of recorded battlefield 
sites (USGS 7.5 M inute Series Topographic Map, 
W illiamsburg Quadrangle).
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T utter’s Neck Pond and  owned by the Colonial W illiamsburg Foundation. 
The redoubt com m anded a  sm all road  (Q uarterpath  Road) runn ing  north  
along the  pond th a t led to the Confederate rear. It consists  of a  large 
ea rthen  parape t su rrounded  by a  moat, an d  includes a  well preserved 
collapsed m agazine and  two earthen  gun platform s (see figure 13). The 
platform s face to the so u th  of the  s tru c tu re  to guard  the flank of the 
line. The m oat w as destroyed on the w estern side of the  fort probably as 
a  resu lt of m odern im provem ents to the road.
Sm all looter p its across the  body of the redoub t a tte s t to the relic 
h u n tin g  th a t h a s  taken  place on the site. B ecause it played a  sm all role 
in the  ac tu a l battle, however, it is unlikely th a t any surviving artifacts 
relate directly to the engagem ent. R ather, the significance of the  site lies 
in its rem arkable s ta te  of preservation. The m agazine an d  gun platform s 
are in excellent condition a s  are the parapets an d  m oat.
This redoubt, along w ith num ber two, is fo rtunate to be owned by 
Colonial W illiamsburg. Development on the site is unlikely an d  the 
F oundation  h as a  capable staff to adm inister the site. W hen a  sm all 
portion of the m oat and  p arape t on the w estern side of the fort were 
dam aged by Virginia Power Com pany vehicles (a power line ru n s  across 
the  redoubt), Colonial W illiam sburg responded by reseeding the  dam aged 
area  an d  covering it w ith straw . Furtherm ore, the W illiam sburg Line 
Preservation Com mittee h as  opened channels w ith the Foundation  to 
a ss is t in the m onitoring of the  site.
Redoubt 2
R edoubt 2 (44JC57), a  rectangu lar fortification ab o u t half a  
kilom eter due n o rth east of Redoubt 1, also sits astride the Q u arterpath
\  d e D r e s s i o n
• levo tsd
gun «mptacam«nt
Possib le  co llapsed  m cgazin*
Collapsed magazine
Gun platform 
(probably bastions)
M oat
S lig h t d e p re s s io n  
( p o s s ib le  b o m b  p r
Q u arte rp a th  Park
Redoubt 4
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Collapsed m ag az in e  
j | Gun p la tfo rm s
x benches
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Figure 13: Plan of Redoubts 1, 2, 3, and  4, clockwise, from top left.
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Road an d  is owned by Colonial W illiamsburg. Like Redoubt 1, it is 
rem arkably well preserved. The fort w as occupied by Longstreet during 
the  battle  and  played a  key role in the  fighting. E lem ents of G eneral A.P. 
Hill’s brigade used  the redoub t a s  a  staging area  during  the Hooker 
engagem ent. A lthough the  site h as  been heavily looted, it is possible 
th a t  sub-surface artifacts relating to the  battle rem ain in tac t in the fort.
The m oat and  parape t are well preserved on three sides of the 
redoub t (see figure 13). Three of the com ers (southeast, southw est, and  
northw est) slope into triangles suggesting the possibility the  fort w as 
bastioned. In addition, a  slight depression approxim ately two m eters 
wide an d  m n n in g  n o rth -so u th  th rough  the body of the  fort suggests the 
presence of a  bom b proof.
Redoubt 3
This square  fortification (44JC58) is approxim ately th ree quarte rs 
in tac t and  owned by the Fort M agruder Inn, a  hotel and  convention 
cen ter on Route 60. The east p arap e t an d  m oat were probably destroyed 
during  the  construction  of the complex (see figure 13). The rem ainder, 
however, is preserved as  a  sm all park  complete w ith benches an d  a 
gazebo for inn  guests. The fort is relatively clear of overgrowth (with the 
exception of the moat) an d  guests are free to walk th rough  the  redoubt 
an d  on the parapet. The interior h as  been partially landscaped  to 
accom m odate the park  an d  ground lights have been installed  for use a t 
night.
The redoubt w as occupied by artillery an d  elem ents of C adm us 
Wilcox’s and  A.P. Hill’s brigades and  used  as a  staging area  during  the 
fighting. It is unlikely, however, th a t artifacts relating  to the battle
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survive in or aro u n d  the fort due to the construction  of the  hotel, the 
park, an d  a  trailer p ark  im m ediately to the east of the redoubt. Although 
the in tac t rem ains have been preserved as  a  park  and  augm ented with 
interpretive signs, the flow of people th rough  the fort an d  especially on 
the p arap e ts  is potentially th rea ten ing  to its  con tinued  preservation. At 
the very least, the inn  should  shou ld  take m easures to keep individuals 
off the  p arape ts  to lessen the  im pact of erosion.
The use of the fort a s  a  public a ttrac tion  does, however, speak 
directly to the  issue of public significance. Indeed, the decision to 
preserve even a  portion of the fort suggests the im portance of the battle 
to local history. The inn  is nam ed for G eneral Jo h n  M agruder an d  is 
decorated w ith p o rtra its  an d  pain tings of Civil W ar figures an d  battles.
A display in  the lobby show cases the Battle of W illiamsburg and  includes 
m ilitary artifacts (such as b u tto n s an d  bullets) probably recovered during 
construction . The m ilitary them e also d istinguishes the  inn  from its 
com petitors in the W illiam sburg area. U nfortunately, however, it 
typifies the problem s associated  w ith th is type of preservation. The 
construction  an d  landscaping  on the property have destroyed p art of the 
fortification, the artifacts in the lobby display were undoubted ly  
recovered unscientifically, an d  the  gift shop sells b u tto n s an d  bullets 
looted from Civil W ar sites.
Redoubt 4
Only a  sm all portion of th is  redoubt (44JC59) rem ains in tac t along 
the C hesapeake and  Ohio railroad tracks ju s t  w est of the Jam es Terrace 
developm ent (see figure 13). The rem aining bit of p arape t is fairly well
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preserved and  augm ented with interpretive signs (see figure 14).
Redoubt 5
Redoubt 5 (44JC60), located in the Jam es Terrace development in 
W illiamsburg, is completely destroyed. Only the general location of the 
fortification is known. It is possible th a t a t least p art of the m oat 
survives cu t in the sub-soil beneath  the development.
Fort 6 (Fort Magruder)
Fort M agruder (44Y047 and  recorded as  Fort 6) sa t astride the two
m ain roads leading from Yorktown to W illiamsburg and  w as the center of
the  Confederate line. In h is official report on the battle, G eneral
McClellan described the fort as:
a  large work in the center w ith a  bastioned front.... The 
p arape t ...is abou t six feet high and  nine feet thick, the ditch 
nine feet wide and  nine feet deep, filled with water. The 
length of the interior crest is abou t 600 yards (OR XI, Pt. 1).
All th a t rem ains today, however, is a  sm all portion of the fort (see figure 
15) owned an d  preserved by the  United D aughters of the Confederacy 
(UDC). The parapet is in fairly good condition, though heavily 
overgrown, b u t the m oat is completely filed in. The UDC m ain ta in  a  
sm all m onum ent on the site (see figure 16) and  hold a  yearly m emorial 
service on the anniversary of the battle. B ecause the fort sits  in the 
m idst of a  heavily developed subu rb , it is unlikely th a t any battle related 
artifacts rem ain in und istu rbed  contexts. However, undeveloped lots in 
the general vicinity of Fort M agruder may contain  in tac t portions of the 
m oat th a t could ass is t in reconstructing  its original dim ensions.
Figure 14: Photograph of historic m arker a t Redoubt 4.
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Figure 15: Plan of Fort Magruder, Fort 8, and Redoubts 10 and 11, 
clockwise, from top left.
Figure 16: Photograph of m em orial a t Fort Magruder.
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Redoubt 7
Redoubt 7 (44Y049), located in  the York Terrace residential 
development, is completely destroyed.
Fort 8
Fort 8 (44YO50), a  chevron redan, sits  in a  heavily wooded area  
roughly one-half mile n o rth -east of the  York Terrace developm ent and  
ju s t  off In tersta te  64 in York County. The fort is rem arkably  well 
preserved with a  platform  to m oun t one gun, a  collapsed m agazine, a  
parapet, an d  a  m oat (see figure 15). The redan  faces to the  no rth -east 
an d  is protected on the  flanks by R edoubts 7 and  9. It w as a ttacked  by 
Union cavalry in the S tonem an engagem ent an d  w as occupied by 
Confederate forces during  the  battle. The site h as  been heavily looted 
an d  it is doubtful th a t m any battle  related artifacts rem ain  in the 
fortification.
Redoubt 9
This redoubt (44Y051) is completely destroyed an d  believed to be 
located u n d er In tersta te  64.
Redoubt 10
This square  fortification (44Y052), located on a  chicken farm  
roughly one-half mile n o rth  of the  York Terrace development, is 
approxim ately one-quarter in tac t (see figure 15). The rem ainder w as
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destroyed by a  residential developm ent ju s t  no rth  of the farm. It is 
cu rren tly  in a  terrible s ta te  of preservation. The m oat is completely filled 
in and  the parap e t h a s  suffered heavily from erosion. No interior 
features su ch  as a  m agazine or gun  platform  are visible on the surface. 
Furtherm ore, the site h as  been heavily looted by relic h u n te rs .
Redoubt 11
This square  fortification (44Y053) is located on the  Colonial 
N ational Parkway in York County an d  owned in p art by the National 
Park Service (see figure 15). The redoubt is completely in tac t w ith a  well 
preserved parapet and  m oat b u t heavily overgrown. Several large fallen 
trees have left sm all c ra ters on the walls of the p arape t an d  the interior 
of the  fort. The overgrowth is so heavy on the interior it is virtually 
im possible to detect interior features su ch  as a  m agazine. Additionally, 
the site h as  been d istu rbed  by looters. The fort w as occupied by Hancock 
on h is move to the Confederate left.
Redoubt 12
This roughly square  fortification (44Y042) is located in the New 
Q uarter Park  in York County. Only three sides of the redoubt rem ain 
in tac t (see figure 17). It is possible the  forth side w as destroyed by the 
construction  of a  softball field ad jacen t to th is  side of the fort. However, 
Redoubt 13, ju s t  no rth  of R edoubt 12, could have protected the rear of 
the fort suggesting the possibility it w as left open ended. If Redoubt 12 
h ad  a  fourth  side, it is probable the c u t for the m oat rem ains in tact 
u n d er the  softball field. O therwise, the fort is rem arkably well
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Figure 17: Plan of Redoubt 12, redan, and Redoubt 14, clockwise, from 
top left.
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preserved w ith two gun platform s, a large parapet, and  a  m oat. There is 
no visible m agazine in the in terior of the redoubt. The fort w as not 
occupied during the battle.
Redoubt 13
This redoubt (44Y037) is completely destroyed an d  believed to be 
located u n d er a  volleyball court in the  New Q uarter Park in York County. 
It is possible the cu t for the m oat rem ains in tac t in the sub-soil. The 
redoubt w as no t occupied during the battle.
Redan
In addition to Redoubts 12 an d  13, a  sm all ea rth en  redan  
(44YO40) also sits  in the New Q uarter Park  in York C ounty (see figure 
17). The fortification is un ique to the W illiamsburg defenses because it 
h a s  an  em brasure cu t th rough  the  center of the p arape t ra th e r th a n  a 
gun  platform. The em brasure would enable a  gun to clear the parape t 
w ithout the  necessity of a  platform . The redan  faces to the  so u th -east 
on a  direct line w ith the C ub Creek Dam  ju s t  in front of Redoubt 14. 
U nfortunately for the Confederate Army, the redan  w as left unoccupied 
during  the battle and  H ancock crossed a  road over the dam  to take 
Redoubt 14. The site is rem arkably well preserved b u t h as  been disturbed 
by looters.
Redoubt 14
Redoubt 14 (44Y054) w as the first fort occupied by H ancock in his
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move to the Confederate left. Owned by the D epartm ent of the  Interior, 
th is  diam ond shaped  fortification (see figure 17) is ju s t  no rth  of the 
Jo n e s  Mill Pond an d  off the Colonial National Parkway. It is in excellent 
condition w ith a  well preserved collapsed m agazine. The m agazine is 
particu larly  in teresting  because it appears to be in two com partm ents 
although  it is possible one of the two is the resu lt of a  tree fall. A sm all 
road leading from the redoubt to the  pond m ay also relate to the 
fortification. The site h as  been heavily looted b u t the a rea  a ro u n d  and  
between th is fort an d  Redoubt 11 is undeveloped and  probably contains 
resources relating to the H ancock engagem ent.
The S tonem an Engagem ent
The m ajority of the S tonem an engagem ent w as fought im m ediately 
to the front of Fort M agruder an d  Redoubts 7 an d  8. The general vicinity 
of Fort M agruder is fairly well developed w ith residential s tru c tu re s  and  
sm all businesses (see figure 12). It is doubtful any m eaningful 
pattern ing  of finds would resu lt from a  survey of the rem aining 
undeveloped lots. It is also highly likely the area  h as  been d istu rbed  by 
looters. Immediately w est of R edoubts 7 and  8, however, the  land  is 
largely undeveloped an d  m ay contain  cu ltu ra l resources related to the 
engagem ent.
In addition, the te rra in  of th is  section of the  battlefield, an d  in 
p articu lar a round  Redoubt 8, is typical of th a t encountered  by the 
soldiers across the  entire line. The a rea  is characterized by a  num ber 
ofdeep ravines cu t by sm all stream s and  pro truding  draws. The high 
ground furn ished  an  ideal se tting  for the observation of approaching 
enem y colum ns and  the ravines provided cover and  concealm ent.
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Furtherm ore, the rough terra in  would have m ade it exceedingly difficult 
for a ttack ing  forces to coordinate an d  execute attacks.
The Hooker Engagem ent
The vast m ajority of th is  section of the  battlefield, an d  indeed the 
entire Union left flank, h as  been d istu rbed  or destroyed by development. 
The area  im m ediately w est of Redoubts 3, 4, an d  5, and  Fort M agruder, 
for example, have suffered residential, com mercial, highway, and  
railroad developm ent. A lthough it is possible th a t som e battle related 
artifacts rem ain in the  sm all pockets of undeveloped area  w ithin th is 
p art of the battlefield, it is doubtfu l any  m eaningful pattern ing  of finds 
still exist.
A sm all portion of the Union left, however, m ay still rem ain in tact. 
The area  im m ediately sou thw est of R edoubt 2 is undeveloped and  was 
occupied by the  ta il ends of the Confederate an d  Union lines. 
Topographically, the  area  is cu t by several seasonal stream s th a t drain  
into T utter’s Neck Pond. The te rra in  is fairly rough (see figure 12) an d  
characterized by a  succession  of sp u rs  an d  a  large ravine th a t fill the 
sm all valley. The land  is now heavily wooded an d  aside from a  few utility 
roads and  a  sm all pum ping sta tion , un inhab ited .
This p a rt of the  battlefield m ay include the  rem ains of three s u b ­
episodes w ithin the larger engagem ent. These include the 11 am  
engagem ent between the 28th , 19th, and  18th Virginia, 14th Louisiana, 
8 th  and  10th Alabam a, an d  the 8 th  New Jersey  (see figure 6); the 1 pm  
engagem ent between the 14th Louisiana, 8 th  Alabam a, 11th Virginia, 
10th Virginia, 10th Alabam a, an d  the  70 th  New York (see figure 7); and  
the 3 pm  engagem ent between the 8 th  an d  18th Virginia an d  the 37th
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New York (see figure 8). Each of these sub-episodes were fought 
approxim ately .5 miles due w est of Redoubt 2. Because they were all 
fought on the sam e ground, however, it may not be possible to 
d istinguish  am ong the  th ree sub-episodes on the basis of artifact 
patterning. It is theoretically possible to sort regim ents according to the 
type of bullet fired (the 8 th  New Jersey  and  70 th  New York, for example, 
are known to have carried M-1855 or M-1861 .58 caliber rifle m uskets 
(Coates an d  Thom as 1990)); given the variety in arm s an d  arm am ents in 
use during the war, however, th is  m ay not be feasible. Rather, it is 
hoped th a t if artifacts do rem ain in un d istu rb ed  contexts, gross p a tte rn s 
m ay emerge to d istinguish  the  tail ends of the two lines.
The H ancock Engagem ent
The H ancock engagem ent w as fought entirely on the Union right 
im m ediately ea s t of R edoubt 11. Some residential developm ent h as  
taken  place in the  im m ediate area. However, the m ajority rem ains as 
undeveloped woodland an d  m ay contain  cu ltu ra l resources relating to 
the battle, particularly  along the  Colonial National Parkway (see figure 
12). The parkw ay also preserves a  significant topographic feature 
associated  w ith Early s charge on Hancock. The m en of the 24 th  Virginia 
and  5 th  North Carolina Regiments charged along a  low, sloping crest 
w here H ancock h ad  positioned h is men. The crest is still visible in the 
undergrow th along the parkway.
Sum m ary
To sum m arize briefly, of the  15 original defensive struc tu res, six
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are in tact, six are partially  in tact, an d  three are destroyed. Three of 
those s tru c tu re s  (Redoubts 2,10, an d  Fort Magruder) have suffered 
severely from the  effects of erosion. In addition, undeveloped lots w ithin 
each of the battle episodes m ay contain  cu ltu ra l resources relating to the 
battle  an d  have preserved several significant topographic features. These 
features include the ravines contained  in the  S tonem an  an d  Hooker 
episodes and  the crest in the  H ancock episode.
C h a p te r  6:
C onclusions and  Recom m endations
The previous chap ters  have outlined the theoretical an d  
methodological background of battlefield archaeology, d iscussed  the 
concept of significance in archaeology, described the history  of the Battle 
of W illiamsburg, and  d iscussed  the  ex tan t cu ltu ra l resources rem aining 
from the  battle. This final ch ap ter argues for the significance of those 
sites and  m akes recom m endations for additional fieldwork and  
preservation / m anagem ent op tions.
Significance
The cu ltu ra l resources rem aining from the Battle of W illiamsburg 
possess archaeological significance a t the local sta te, and  n ational level. 
Six of the  defensive s tru c tu re s  are completely in tact, six are partially  
in tact, an d  only three are destroyed (see figure 18). Several of the 
fortifications are significant a s  individual s tru c tu re s  given the ir 
rem arkable sta te  of preservation an d  the fam ous historic persons who 
occupied them . Redoubt 14, for example, w as occupied by General 
H ancock who w as com m ended by G eneral McClellan for h is actions on 
the  Confederate left an d  would become a m ajor player in the rest of the 
war. Furtherm ore, the  leading Union elem ent to take the redoubt was 
led by a  young lieu tenan t by the  nam e of George A rm strong C uster 
(Kettenburg 1980).
In toto, however, the W illiam sburg defenses are significant as  an
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A Comparison of Intact to  
Destroyed Fortifications
A Comparison o f intact to destroyed fortifications
Intact
Partially Intact 
Destroyed
Figure 18: A com parison of in tac t to destroyed fortifications.
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example of a  Civil War era  defensive line. While it is tru e  th a t some of 
the s tru c tu re s  have been destroyed by development, the line roughly 
possesses integrity of setting, location, and  feeling. A com parison of the 
individual redoub ts and  forts no t only w ith one an o th er b u t also with 
o ther defensive lines m ay enlighten our understand ing  of m id-nineteenth  
cen tu ry  defensive operations. Special a tten tion  shou ld  focus on the 
rela tionsh ip  of the orientation  of the  forts to the region’s topography or 
how the spa tia l relationships between the forts contribu te to the 
battlefield landscape. S uch  com parisons m ay be m ade to o ther Virginia 
engagem ents or to those th roughou t the  country.
Finally, the W illiam sburg line is particu larly  significant a t the 
local level. W illiamsburg is a  sm all sou thern  city w ith a  rich cu ltu ra l 
trad ition  dating to the early seventeenth  century. It w as hom e of the 
second colonial capital after Jam estow n an d  selected as the site of the 
College of William and  Mary. The creation of the  Colonial W illiamsburg 
Foundation  m useum  h as  helped to preserve th a t heritage. T hat two Civil 
W ar arm ies m arched th rough  the town and  fought a  battle  is equally 
significant. To ignore the cu ltu ra l resources of th a t event while 
preserving, studying, an d  excavating those of the colonial era  is to 
belittle the history  of the city th rough  time. Furtherm ore, the local 
public h as  a  p articu lar in te rest in the  fort sites. The W illiam sburg Line 
Preservation Com mittee in conjunction  with the  local Civil W ar Round 
Table are currently  working to preserve and  protect the  defensive line. 
This speaks directly to the question  of public significance.
In addition to the fortifications, several significant topographic 
features are preserved on the  battlefield. These include the ravines 
associated  w ith the S tonem an an d  Hooker episodes an d  the crest 
associated  w ith the  H ancock episode. In conjunction, these features
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form p art of the  cu ltu ra l landscape th a t defined the battlefield.
It is no t yet possible to determ ine if any  cu ltu ra l resources from 
the S tonem an, Hooker or, H ancock episodes rem ain in tac t because these 
areas have no t been archaeologically tested. If such  resources do rem ain 
in tact, it m ay th en  be possible to identify artifact pattern ing  in the finds.
Archaeological R ecom m endations
Several recom m endations are m ade for additional archaeological 
fieldwork. First, phase 2 tests  of the u n d istu rbed  portions of the 
S tonem an, Hooker, and  H ancock episodes would perm it a  sound  
determ ination  of their significance an d  assess  the  need for any 
additional work. Second, the ex tan t fortifications should  be m apped in 
far g reater detail. A lthough the  p lans presented  in th is thesis are a  step  
in the right direction, the  parapets, m oats, and  o ther in te rna l features 
shou ld  all be m apped in profile an d  in detailed plan an d  photographed. 
Aerial photographs would be a  satisfying supplem ent to the overall plans. 
Finally, phase 2 te s ts  of R edoubts 1 and  2 to locate the  rifle p its outside 
the fortifications would enable a  more accurate  reconstruction  of how 
they looked in 1862.
Preservation/M anagem ent O ptions
Justification  to protect an d  m anage historic landscape 
resources is based  on a  belief th a t these places educate and  
stim ulate  the kind of creative reflections th a t are good for the 
people an d  critical for the  nation . It is un fo rtuna te  th a t we 
are a  nation  of historic an d  geographic illiterates (Lamme)
1989: 191-192).
Several options for preserving and  m anaging the  W illiamsburg
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Battlefield are available to local governm ent and  o ther in terested 
constituencies. These parties include no t only the governm ents of 
W illiamsburg, Jam es City County, and  York County, b u t also Colonial 
W illiamsburg, the National Park Service, The W illiam sburg Line 
Preservation Committee, The United D aughters of the Confederacy, and  
private landow ners.
The W illiamsburg Line Preservation Com mittee is curren tly  
spearheading  efforts to preserve the battlefield by lobbying against 
developm ent on the ex tan t cu ltu ra l resources. They are working to 
in te rest n a tional preservation societies, su ch  as the Association for the 
Preservation of Civil W ar Sites, in p u rchasing  battlefield sites. 
Additionally, they are working to coordinate an d  educate  the o ther 
concerned parties to preserve the battlefield. The long term  goal is to 
create a  Civil Wax park  in W illiamsburg (King, personal com m unication 
1995).
Currently, five of the ex tan t redoubts are owned by parties with 
preservation in terests. R edoubts 1 an d  2 are owned by Colonial 
W illiamsburg, Fort M agruder is owned by the United D aughters of the 
Confederacy, an d  R edoubt 14 an d  p art of Redoubt 11 are owned by the 
National Park Service. For the  time being, these s tru c tu re s  m ay be 
considered preserved an d  u n th rea tened  by development. Additionally, 
the National Park  Service ow ns a  portion of the to ta l a rea  encom passing 
the H ancock engagem ent. All o ther portions of the battlefield, however, 
are in private or city or county  ow nership an d  are curren tly  unprotected. 
A lthough Redoubt 12 and  a redan  are located in a  York County public 
park, the county  does no t have the resources to staff the park  and  are 
considering leasing the  land  for the developm ent of a  golf course (King, 
personal com m unication 1995).
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The city of W illiamsburg is currently  considering a  p lan  to 
estab lish  an  archaeological d istric t to protect th rea tened  sites. Such  a 
d istric t could potentially include sites associated  w ith the battle. If 
adopted, the plain would in su re  th a t archaeological assessm en ts  of these 
sites be m ade prior to any development. It would not, however, include 
sites outside the d istric t or in su re  th a t they are preserved (Brown, 
personal com m unication 1995). While certainly a  step  in the right 
direction, a  com prehensive p lan  would have to include Jam es City and  
York C ounties to cover the  entire battlefield.
O ther options available for preserving the battlefield m ay include 
new zoning restric tions (such a s  a  Historic D istrict Zoning Ordinance), 
the  estab lishm ent of easem ents, voluntary  preservation or stew ardship  
program s, updating  the  RP3 plan for W illiamsburg, York County, and  
Jam es City C ounty w ith greater em phasis on Civil W ar resources, and  
creating a  general im plem entation p lan  for the preservation of these sites 
(Lichtenberger 1995). Additionally, funds an d  technical assis tance  for 
the  preservation of historic resources are available from the sta te  
th rough  the Certified Local G overnm ent Program  (CLG). W illiamsburg 
becam e a CLG in 1994; Jam es City and  York C ounties could consider 
applying for CLG s ta tu s  an d  use  a t least a  portion of any  funds received 
for the preservation of battlefield sites. Finally, N ational Register s ta tu s  
could be considered for these sites.
At th is time, it is no t feasible to reccom end a  specific 
com prehensive plan. The W illiam sburg Line Preservation Com mittee is 
still working to coordinate all involved parties and  exploring different 
preservation options. S uch  a  p lan  should  soon be forthcom ing from this 
organization.
81
Conclusions
In conclusion, several significant sites rem ain in tac t from the 
Battle of W illiamsburg. The line of fortifications is m ost significant as  
an  exam ple of a  m id-nineteenth  cen tu ry  defensive line. They also enjoy 
broad public support. O ther sections of the battlefield m ay contain  
in tac t cu ltu ra l resources b u t these have yet to be explored. This thesis 
h a s  sought to identify potentially significant sites and  begin to organize 
the archaeological database. Recom m endations for additional fieldwork 
consist of m apping and  photographing the fortifications in far g reater 
detail an d  conducting phase 2 tests  of unexplored areas. Furtherm ore, a  
com prehensive plan for m anaging these sites is necessary  to in su re  their 
continued  preservation. S uch  a  p lan  should  build off of the  work already 
begun by the  W illiamsburg Line Preservation Committee and  consider all 
available options.
APPENDIX A:
UNITS ENGAGED AT WILLIAMSBURG
82
THE O P PO S IN G  FO RC ES AT W ILLIAMSBURG, V A .
T h e  com position , losses, and  s tre n g th  of each  a rm y  as he re  s ta te d  g ive  th e  g ist of all th e  d a ta  o b ta inab le  in  th e  Official 
R ecords. K s tan d s  fo r killed  ; w for w o u n d e d ; m w fo r m o rta lly  w o u n d e d ; m for c ap tu re d  o r m issing  ; c for cap tu red .
THE UNION FORCES.
MtOor-General George B. McClellan. Brigadier-General Edwin V. S u m n e r ,  second in command. /
TH IR D  ARMY CORPS, Brigadier-G eneral Samuel P. 
Helntzelm an.
b k c o it d  d i v i s i o n . Brig.-Gen. Joseph Hooker.
First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Cuvier G rover: 1st Mass., 
Col. R obert C ow din; 11th Mass., Col. William B laisdell; 
2d N. H ., Col. Gilman M arston ; 26th Pa., Col. W illiam 
F. Small (w), Major Casper M. Berry. B rigade loss : k, 33; 
w, 186; in, 34 =  253. Second Brigade, CoL Nelson T ay lo r : 
70th N. Y., Col. William Dw ight, J r . <w c), Major Thomas 
H o lt: 72d N. Y.. Lieut.-Col. Israel M oses: 73d N. Y..Col. 
William R. B rew ster; 74th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Charles.H. 
B urtis. Brigade lo ss : k, 191; w, 349; m, 232 =  772. 
Third Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Francis E. P a tte rso n : 6th 
N. J ., Col. Samuel H. S ta rr; 6th N. J ., Lieut.-Col. John  
P. Van L eer (kj, M^j. George C. B urling ; 7th N. J ., 
Lieut.-CoL E zra  A. C arm an (w), Maj. Francis P rice, Jr.; 8th N ..J . ,  Col. Adolphus J . Johnson (w), M^j. P e te r  H. 
Ryerson (k). Brigade loss: k, 109; w, 353; m. 64 =  526. 
Artillery, Maj. Charles S. W ainw riglit: D, 1st N. Y.. 
Capt. Thom as W. Osborn; 4th N. Y.. Capt. Jam es E. 
S m ith ; 6tb N. Y., Capt. W alter M. B ram h all; H, 1st U.
5., Capt. Charles H. Webber. A rtillery loss: k, 4; w, 
20 =  24.
t h i r d  d i v i s i o n , Brig.-Gen. Philip  K eam v. Staff loss : 
k, 2.
First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Charles D. Ja m e so n : 87tli 
N. Y., Col. Stephen A. Dodge; 57th Pa., CoL Charles 
T. C am pbell: 63d Pa., Col. A lexander H a y s ; 105th Pa7, 
Col. Am or A. McKnight. Second Brigade, Brig.-Gen. 
D avid B. B irn ey : 3d Me., Col. Henry G. Staples ; 4th 
Me., Col. E lijah W alker; 38th N. Y.. CoL J .  H. H obart 
W ard: 40th N. Y., CoL E dw ard  J . Riley. Brigade 
loss: k, 16; w. 92; m, 10 =  118. Third Brigade, Brig.- 
Gen. H iram  G. B e r ry : 2d Mich., Col. Orlando M. 
Poe; 3d Mich., Col. Stephen G. C ham plin; 5th Mich., 
Col. H enry  D. T e rry ; 37th N. Y., Col. Sam uel B. Haj*- 
m an. B rigade loss: k, 69; w. 223 ; m, 7=299. Artillery, 
Capt. Jam es Thompson : B. 1st X. J .. Cnpt. Jo h n  E. 
Beam ; E. 1st R. I., Cnpt. George E. R andolph ; G, 2d U.
5., Capt. Jam es Thompson.
FOURTH ARMY CORPS, B rigadier-G eneral E rasm us 
D. Keyes.
C ava lry: 5th U. S., Major Joseph H. W hittlesey. 
f i r s t  d i v i s i o n . Brig.-Gen. D arius N. Couch.
First Brigade, Col. Ju liu s W. A dam s: 65th N. Y. (1st U. 
8. Chasseurs), Lieut.-Col. A lexander Shaler; 67th N. Y. 
(1st Long Island). Lieut.-Col. Nelson Cross; 23d Pa., 
Col. Thom as H. N e ill; 3lst Pa.. CoL D avid H. W illiam s; 
61st Pa.. CoL O liverH . Rippey. Second Brigade, Brig.- 
Gen. Jo h n  J . Peck : 55th N. Y.. Col. P. Resris de Tro- 
b riand ; 62d N. Y .,  Col. Jo h n  L. R iker; 93d Pa.. Col. Jam es 
M. M cC arter; 08th Pa .Col. John F .B allier; 102d Pa.. Col. 
Thomas A. Rowley. Brigade lo ss: k, 1 8 ; w, 82; m , 24 =  
124. Third Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Charles Deveus, J r . : 
7th Mass., Col. David A. R ussell; 10th Mass., Col. H enry
S. B riggs; 2d R. I., Col. F rank W heaton. Brigade ioM 
(7th M ass.): k, l ;  w, 2 =  3. Artillery, Maj. R obert M. 
W est: C, 1st Pa., Capt. Jerem iah M cC arthy; D, 1st Pa., 
Capt. E dw ard  H. F lo o d : E, 1st Pa., Capt. Theodore 
M ille r; H, 1st Pa., Capt. Jam es Brady. 
s e c o n d  d i v i s i o n . Brig.-Gen.Wllliam F. Smith.
First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Winfield S. H ancock (also in 
tem porary  command of Davidson’s Third B rigade): 6th 
Me., Col. H iram  B urnham ; 43d N Y., Col. F ranc is L. 
Vinton ; 49th Pa., CoL William H. Irw in ; 5th Wis., CoL 
Am asa Cobb. Brigade lo ss : k, 8; w, 76 ; m, 1 =  85. 
Second Brigade, Brig G en . W. T. H. B rooks: 2d Vt., 
Col. H enry  W hiting; 3d V t, Col. Breed N. H yde; 4th 
Vt., Col. Edwin H. S tough ton ; 5th Vt., Lieut.-Col. Lewis
A. G ra n t; 6th Vt., Col. N athan Lord. B rigade loss: w, 
2. Third Brigade (tem porarily under H ancock’s com­
m and) : 7th Me., Col. Edwin C. Mason ; 33d N. Y., CoL 
Robert F. T aylor; 49th N. Y., Col. Daniel D. Bidwell; 
76th N. Y.. Col. Jam es B. McKean. ..B rigade  loss-t33d 
N. Y ): w, 10. Artillery, Capt. Rom eyn B. A yres: 1st 
N. Y., Lieut. Andrew C owan; 3d N. Y., Capt. Thaddeus 
P  M ott; E, 1st N. Y ., Capt. Charles C. W heeler; F, 5th 
U. S., Capt Romeyn B. Ayres.
T H IR D  D IV IS IO N , Brig.-Gen. Silas Casey.
First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. H enry M. N aglee: 11th Me., 
Col. Jo h n  C. Caldwell; 56th N. Y'.. Col. Charles H. Van 
W yck; 100th N. Y., CoL Jam es M. B row n; 52d Pa., 
Col. John C. Dodge, J r . ; 104th Pa., Col. W. W. H. Davis. 
Second Brigade, Brig.-Gen. William H. K eim : 96th N. 
Y„ Lieut.-Col. Charles O. Gray ; 85th Pa.. Col. Joshua B. 
H ow ell; 101st Pa., Col. Joseph H. W ilson; 103d Pa.,M aj. 
Audley W. Gazzam. Brigade loss (103d P a . ) : w, 2. 
Third Brigade, B rig .G en . Inuis N. P a lm er: 81st N. Y., 
Lieut.-Col. Jacob J .  De F o re s t; 85th X. Y., Col. Jo n a th an  
S. Belknap: 92d N. Y„  Lieut.-Col. H iram  Anderson, J r . ; 
93d N. Y„ Lieut.-Col. Beniam in C. BuUer; 98th N. Y„ 
Col. W illiam Dutton. Artillery, Col. Guilford D. B ailey: 
7th N. Y„ Capt. P e ter C. Regan ; 8th X. Y., Capt. B utler 
F itch ; A, 1st N. Y., Capt. Thomas H. B a tes; H, 1st N. 
Y., Capt. Joseph  Spratt.
a d v a n c e - g u a r d ,  Brig.-Gen. George Stdneman. Brig.- 
Gen. P. St. George Cooke and William H. Em ory, bri­
gade commanders.
C avalry: 8th HI., Col. Jo h n  F. F a rn sw o rth ; McClellan 
(111.) Dragoons, Maj. Charles W. B a rk e r: 3d Pn., Col. Will­
iam W. A verell: 1st U. S.. Lieut.-Col. William N. G rier; 
Gth U. S., Mai. Law rence Williams. Artillery, Lieut.- 
Col. William H a y s : B and L. 2d U. S.. Capt. Jam es M. 
Robertson: M. 2d 17. S.. Capt. H enry Benson; C, 3d U.
S., Capt. H oratio G. G ibson; K. 3d U. S., Capt. Jo h n  C. 
Tidball. Advance-guard loss (mostly on May 4 th ): k, 15; 
w, 33; m, 1 =49.
The to ta l  loss of the Union arm y (May 4th and 5th) was 
468 killed, 1442 wounded, and 373 cap tured  or m issing =  
2283.
THE CONFEDERATE FORCES.
M ajor-General Jam es L ongstreet in imm ediate command on the field.General Joseph E. Johnston.
s e c o n d  d i v i s i o n  (Longstreet’s).
First Brigade, Brig.-Geu. Ambrose P. H ill : 1st Va.. 
Col. Louis B. W illiams (w), Maj. William H. P alm er (W); 
7th Va.. Col. .Tames L. K em per: 11th Va., Col. Samuel 
G arland (W) : 17th Va., Col. M. D. Corse. Brigade loss: 
k. 67; w. 245 : 111. 14 =  32C. S econd  Brigade, Brig.-Gen. 
R ichard  H. Anderson (in command on the  right). CoL 
Micah Jen k in s: 4th s C. (Battalion). Maj. C. S. M atti- 
son ; 5th S. C., Col. John R. R. Giles ; 6th S. C.. Col. John  
B ra tton : Palm etto  (S. C.i Sharp-shooters. Col. Micah 
Jenkins. Lieut.-Col. Joseph W alker; La. Foot Rifles.
Capt. McG. Goodwvn : Fauquier iVa.i A rtillery. Capt. 
R obert M. S trib ling; W illiamsburg (Va.) A rtillery, 
12 guns). Capt W illiam R. G a rre tt; Richmond (Va.), 
H ow itzers (2 guns). Capt. Edward s. McCarthy. Brigade 
loss: k, 10: w. 75; m. 6=91. Third Brigade. Brig.-Gen. 
George E. P ic k e tt: 8th Va., Lieut -Col. Norbourne 
B erkeley; 18th Va.. Lieut.-Col. H enry A. C arrington; 
19th Va., Col. John  B. S tran g e ; 28th Va.. Col. Robert 
C. A llen ; Va. B attery , Capt. Jam es Dearing. Bri­
gade lo ss: k, 26: w, 138; m. 26=  190. Fourth Brigade, 
Brig.-Gen. Cadmus M. W ilcox: 9th Ala., Col. 8amuel
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H enry; 10th Ala.. Col. John J . W oodward; 19th Miss.. 
Col. Christopher H. Mutt ik>, Lieut.-Col. L. (^ . C. Lauiur. 
Brigade loss: k and w. 231. Fifth Brigade , Brig.-Gen. 
R oger A. P ry o r: 3th Ala.. Lieut.-Col. Thomas E. Irby 
<k) ; l l th  Ala.. Mai. O. K. McLemore; l i th  La.. Col. 
R. W. Jo n es: 32d Va. d e tach m en t); Richmond (Va.) 
F aye tte  A rtillery. Lieut. \V. I. Clopton. Brigade loss : 
k, w, and m. 2U. Colston's Brigade, Brig.-Gen. R. E. Col­
ston: 13th N. C., Col. Alfred M. Seales; U th  X. C\, Col. 
P . W. R oberts; 3d Va.. Col. Joseph  Mayo. Brigade loss 
not separately  reported. Donaldsonville (La.) B atte ry  
(3 guns;, L ieut. Lestang Fortier.
f o u r t h  d iv i s io n .  Major-Geu. Daniel H. H ill tin com­
m and on the left).
E arly 's Brigade . Brig.-Gen. Ju b a l A. E arly  (w). Col. D. 
K. M cRae: 5th X. C.. Col. D. K. M cRae; 23d X. C.. 
CoL John  F. Hoke. Maj. D aniel H. C hristie ; 21th 
Va., CoL W illiam R. Terry nvi, M ajor R ichard  L. 
M aury; 38th Va.. Lieut.-Col. Pow hatan  B. W hittle. 
B rigade loss (except 5th X. C., not re p o rte d ): k, 30; w.
106; in. 70=206. Rodes’s Brigade, Brig.-Gen. R. E. 
Itodes: 5th Ala.. Col. C. C. Pegues: 6th Ala., Col. John
B. G ordon; 12th Ala., Col R. T. Jo n es; 12th Miss., Col. 
W. H. Taylor. R ains’s Brigade. Brig.-Gen. G. J. Rains: 
13th Ala.. Col. B. D. F ry ; 26th Ala., Col. E. A. O’Neal; 
Gth Ga.. Col. A. II. C olqu itt; 23d Ga., Col. Thos. H utcher­
son. Featherstou s Brigade . Brig.-Gen. W. S. Featlier- 
s to u : 27th Ga., CoL Levi B. Sm ith; 28th Ga., Col. T. J. 
W arthen ; 4th X. C., Col. George B. Anderson ; 49th Va., 
Col. W illiam Smith. Vnattached : 2d F la., Col. George T. 
Ward (ki ; 2d Miss. B attalion. Lieut.-Col. Jo h n  G. Taylor. 
U nattached  loss : k ,  9 ; w, 61; in. 11 =  81.
c a v a l r y  b r i g a d e . Brig.-Gen. J . E. B. S tu a r t : 3d Va., 
Col. Thomas F. Goode ; 4th Va., Maj. W illiam H. Payne 
(w), Capt. R. E. U tterback: Jeff Davis Legion, Lieut.- 
Col. William T. M artin ; Wise Legion, Col. J .  Lucius 
D a v is ; S tu a rt Horse A rtillery, C aptain Jo h n  Pelham. 
B rigade loss : k. 1; w, 3 =  4.
The to ta l loss of the Confederate Arm y w as 288 killed. 
975 wounded, and 297 cap tured  o r m issing =  1560.
From:
Anonymous,
n .d  B attles an d  Leaders of the Civil War (2): 200-201.
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SITE SURVEY FORM
NAME OF SITE: Fort 1 SITE NUMBER: 44JC 56
STUDY UNITS: XII XXIII
TYPE OF SITE: Earthwork
CULTURAL AFFILIATION: Historic: Civil War
MAP REFERENCE: U.S.G.S. OUAD SHEET Williamsburg 
U.T.M. ZONE IS EASTING 350480 NORTHING 4124200
OWNER/ADDRESS: Colonial WiI 1iamsburg, Inc.
TENANT/ADDRESS:
ATTITUDE TOWARD INVESTIGATION:
INFORMANT/ADDRESS: : Earl C.S< David Hasting, 169 Dennis Dr., Wmsbq- 229—724
SURVEYED BY: Edward Chappell 
DATE: 1971
GENERAL SURROUNDINGS: On a knoll north o-f Tutter's Neck Dam
NEAREST WATER (NATURE, DIRECTION, AND DISTANCE):
500' s to Tutter's Neck Pond
DIMENSION OF SITE: 100 >: 100' as mapped.
DESCRIPTION: This redoubt anchored the right of the Confederate line on
Tutters Neck Pond and commanded a road to Williamsburg and the Confederate 
rear. See VHLC Survey 47-47.
SPECIMENS COLLECTED: None
SPECIMENS REPORTED: None
OTHER DOCUMENTATION: "Lee's Lieuts" by D.S. Freeman. "Official Records of the
Union and Confederate Armies" (Series I, Part III, Vol. XI, and Series I,
Part I, Vol. XI). "From Manassas to Appomattox" James Longstreet. "Battles 
and Leaders of the Civil War" Vol. 2. "Narrative off Military Operations" by 
J. E. Johnston.
CONDITION: Unknown
RECOMMENDATIONS: None made
PHOTO: None
RECORDED BY: Keith Eg1 off
MAP: Appended
DATE: 2 Dec. 1977
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SITE SURVEY FORM
NAME OF SITE: Fort 2 SITE NUMBER: 44JC 57
STUDY UNITS: XII XXIII
TYPE OF SITE: Earthwork
CULTURAL AFFILIATION: Historic: Civil War
MAP REFERENCE: U.S.G.S. QUAD SHEET Williamsburg 
U.T.M. ZONE 18 EAST ING 350790 NORTHING 4124680
OWNER/ADDRESS: Colonial Williamsburg 
TENANT/ADDRESS:
ATTITUDE TOWARD INVESTIGATION:
INFQRMANT/ADDRESS:
SURVEYED BY: Chappell 
DATE: 1971
GENERAL SURROUNDINGS: 3/4 mile SW of James Terrace
NEAREST WATER (NATURE. DIRECTION, AND DISTANCE):
1200' E to unnamed stream draining into Tutter's Neck Pond
DIMENSION OF SITE: 200 >: 200' as mapped.
DESCRIPTION: This redoubt, along with numbers 3,4,and 5 was occupied by 
elements o-f Longstreets Division during the night of May 4-5, 1862 in the
face of arrival of strong Union forces east of these positions. See 
VHLC Survey 47-48.
SPECIMENS COLLECTED: None
SPECIMENS REPORTED: None 
OTHER DOCUMENTATION: See 44JC56
CONDITION: Unknown
RECOMMENDATIONS: None made
PHOTO: None MAP: Appended
RECORDED BY: Keith Egloff DATE: 2 Dec. 1977
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SITE SURVEY FORM
NAME OF SITE: Fort 3 SITE NUMBER: 44JC 58
STUDY UNITS: XII XXIII
TYPE OF SITE: Earthwork
CULTURAL AFFILIATION: Historic: Civil War
MAP REFERENCE: U.S.G.S. QUAD SHEET Williamsburg 
U.T.M. ZONE 18 EASTING 351000 NORTHING 4125180
OWNER/ADDRESS:
TENANT/ADDRES5:
ATTITUDE TOWARD INVESTIGATION:
INFQRMANT/ADDRESS:
SURVEYED BY: Chappell 
DATE: 2 Dec. 1977
GENERAL SURROUNDINGS: Edge of trailer park at city limits.
NEAREST WATER (NATURE, DIRECTION, AND DISTANCE):
1000' SE to unnamed stream draining into Tutter's Neck Pond
DIMENSION OF SITE: 200 >: 200' as mapped
DESCRIPTION: Square fortification. Very well preserved, but threatened 
by prime location for development. Historical events about as described 
for Redoubt 2 (44JC57). See VHLC Survey 47-49.
SPECIMENS COLLECTED: None
SPECIMENS REPORTED: None 
OTHER DOCUMENTATION: See 44JC56
CONDITION: Unknown
RECOMMENDATIONS: None made
PHOTO: None
RECORDED BY: Keith Egloff
MAP: Appended
DATE: 2 Dec. 1977
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SITE SURVEY FORM
NAME OF SITE: Fort 4 SITE NUMBER: 44JC 59
STUDY UNITS: XII XXIII
TYPE OF SITE: Earthwork
CULTURAL AFFILIATION: Historic: Civil War
MAP REFERENCE: U.S.G.S. QUAD SHEET Williamsburg 
U.T.M. ZONE 18 EASTING 351310 NORTHING 4125170
OWNER/ADDRESS:
TENANT/ADDRESS:
ATTITUDE TOWARD INVESTIGATION:
INFORMANT/ADDRESS:
SURVEYED BY: Chappell 
DATE: 1971
GENERAL SURROUNDINGS: Route 60 W o-f James Terrace
NEAREST WATER (NATURE, DIRECTION, AND DISTANCE):
700' SW to unnamed stream draining into Tutter's Neck: Pond
DIMENSION OF SITE: Unknown
DESCRIPTION: Only a -fragmentary corner o-f this -f orti-f i cat i on remains on 
the northern edge o-f CS<0 RR tracks. Historical events about as described 
for Redoubt 2 (44JC57). See VHLC Survey 47-50.
SPECIMENS COLLECTED: None
SPECIMENS REPORTED: None 
OTHER DOCUMENTATION: See 44JC56
CONDITION: Unknown
RECOMMENDATIONS: None made
PHOTO: None MAP: None
RECORDED BY: Keith Eg1 off DATE: 2 Dec. 1977
SITE SURVEY FORM
NAME OF SITE: Fort 5 SITE NUMBER: 44JC
STUDY UNITS: XII XXIII
T'rPE OF SITE: Earthwork
CULTURAL AFFILIATION: Historic: Civil War
M A P  REFERENCE: U.S.G.S. QUAD SHEET Williamsburg
U.T.M. ZONE 10 EASTING 351080 NORTHING 4125170
OWNER/ADDRESS:
TENANT/ADDRESS:
ATTITUDE TOWARD INVESTIGATION:
INFORMANT/ADDRESS:
SURVEYED BY: Chappell 
DATE: 1971
GENERAL SURROUNDINGS: James Terrace
NEAREST WATER (NATURE, DIRECTION, AND DISTANCE):
1 0 0 0 '  S To unnamed stream draining into Tutter's Neck. Pond.
DIMENSION OF SITE: 600 x 600' as mapped.
DESCRIPTION: General area o-f this destroyed -fortification. Historical 
events about as described tor Redoubt 2 (44JC57). See VHLC Survey 47-
SPECIMENS COLLECTED: None
SPECIMENS REPORTED: None 
OTHER DOCUMENTATION: See 44JC56
CONDITION: Unknown
RECOMMENDATIONS: None made
PHOTO: None MAP: None
RECORDED BY: Keith Egloff DATE: 2 Dec. 1977
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3ITE SURVE . FORM
NAME u F isITE: Fort 6 "alfE NUMBER: 44YQ 47
S T U D Y  UNITS: *11 XXIII
T . - F E  OF SITE: Earthworf
r_ I.; t .Ti.iRAL AFFILIATION: Historic , C i v i l  War
MAP REFERENCE: U.S.G.S. QUAD SHEET Williamsburg 
u.T.M. ZONE 13 EASTING 352250 NORTHING 4125270
OWNER/ADDRESS:
TENANT/ADDRESS:
ATTITUDE TOWARD INVESTIGATION:
I NFQRMANT/ADDRESS:
SURVEYED BY: Chappell 
DATE: 197 1
GENERAL SURROUNDINGS: By a church in suburbia.
NEAREST WATER (NATURE, DIRECTION, AND DISTANCE):
DIMENSION OF SITE:
DESCRIPTION: The small reminant of this large fortification marked and
preserved by U.D.C. This very large & strong fortification was the ctr of 
the Confederate defensive line and sat astride the 2 primary rds. to Rich­
mond via the Peninsula. See VHLC Survey 47-52.
SPECIMENS COLLECTED:
SPECIMENS REPORTED:
OTHER DOCUMENTATION: See 44JC56. See Abbott 1862 map and Hope 1862
CONDITION: Fenced off and overgrown.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
PHOTO: MAP:
RECORDED BY: Keith Egloff DATE: 2 Dec. 1977
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SITE SURVEY FORM
NAME o f  SITE: Fort 7 SITE NUMBER: 44YO 49
S T U D Y  UNITS: XII XXIII 
I t'PE OF SITE: Erjrthwurt:
CULTURAL AFP IL I AT I O N : Historic, C l i 1 War
M A P  REFERENCE: U.S.G.S. QUAD SHEET Williamsburg 
U.7.M. ZONE IS EASTING 35301*) NORTHING 4125310
OWNER/ADDRESS:
TENANT/ADDRESS:
ATTITUDE TOWARD INVESTIGATION:
INFORMANT/ADDRESS:
SURVEYED BY: Chappell 
DATE: 197 1
GENERAL SURROUNDINGS:
NEAREST WATER (NATURE, DIRECTION, AND DISTANCE):
DIMENSION OF SITE:
DESCRIPTION: This redoubt, like Fort 8, played a key part on the battle. 
On the afternoon of May 4, 1862 it was attacked by elements o-f the Union 
cavalry advanced guard under Gen. Phillip St. George Cooke. See VHLC 
Survey 99-38.
SPECIMENS COLLECTED:
SPECIMENS REPORTED:
OTHER DOCUMENTATION: See 44JC56
CONDITION:
RECOMMENDATIONS:
PHOTO:
RECORDED BY: Keith Egloff
MAP:
DATE: 2 Dec. 1977
93
I T L~ ' - ' U F F p  •' F m PI ’1
i.|h MIZ OF SITE: Fori- A ZITE NUMBER: 44Y0 50
^ T i l D T  UI JIT5: i  V 1 I
f t F E  O F  S I T E :  E a  r  t | , w o r i .
Ml!. fURAL AFFILIATION: Historic. Civil War
; i.OF FEFERENCE: U . S .  ( 3 . 0 .  OUAD SHEET W i 11 i amsburq 
: I . T . M .  ZONE 18 EASTING 353220 NORTHING 4125760
OWNER/ADDRESS:
TENANT/ADDRESS:
ATTITUDE TOWARD INVESTIGATION:
INFORMANT/ADDRESS:
SURVEYED BY: Chappell 
DATE: 1971
GENERAL SURROUNDINGS: Rte. 64
NEAREST WATER (NATURE. DIRECTION. AND DISTANCE):
DIMENSION OF SITE:
DESCRIPTION: Chevron—shaped f orti-f i cat i o n . Historical events about as 
described -for Redoubt 7 (44Y049). See VHLC Survey 99-39.
SPECIMENS COLLECTED:
SPECIMENS REPORTED:
OTHER DOCUMENTATION: See 44JC56
FOND IT ION:
RECOMMENDATIONS:
PHOTO: MAP:
RECORDED BY: Keith Eoloff DATE: 2 Dec. 1977
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I CURVE./ = C,c M
i . - l - J  OF  B I T E :  I - o r  t  B I T E
STUDY UNITS: VII O' I I I
T r P E  O F  B I T E :  E r ? r t h w o r t :
■“! ii.TI.lRAL A F F  1LIA1 ION: Hi stoi ic, C i \ 1 War
U A F  R E F E R E N C E ;  U.S.G., S. .  OUAD S H E E T  H i  ] ] l  s m s b n r a  
! 1. r , M.  Z ONE IS EAST ING 353 1 0 0  NORTHING 4 1 2 6 1 0 V
OWNER AD DREGS:
T E N A N T / A D D R E S S :
ATTITUDE TOWARD INVESTIGATION:
INFORMANT/ADDRESS:
SURVEYED BY: Chappell 
DATE: 2 Dec. 1977
GENERAL SURROUNDINGS: Rte. 64, believed to be the location
destroyed fortification,
NEAREST WATER (NATURE, DIRECTION, AND DISTANCE):
DIMENSION OF SITE:
DESCRIPTION: See VHLC Survey 99-40.
SPECIMENS COLLECTED:
SPECIMENS REPORTED: 
OTHER DOCUMENTATION: See 44 JC56
CONDITION:
RECOMMENDATIONS:
N U M & E F : r Q  ^ ^
of this
PHOTO:
RECORDED BY: Keith Egloft
MAP:
DATE: 2 Dec. 1977
95
s i j p “"■r-r-'
HmMF u F SITE: For v lo r TT i ;l iMBL-.R : 4 4 /Q e;
S T ' I D V  U N I T S :  ‘' I I  * X I I I
T /  P E  O F  S I T E :  E a r * ' t i w o r k
C.1 I I . T I J P A L  A F F I L I A T I O N :  H i ^ t ' j r  ! r  ,, L i v y ]  W * i •
MAP FEFERENCE: U.S. G . S. QUAD SHEET'
M . T . r - i .  Z O NE  I B  E A S T I N G  " N r  ~ 4 0  N O R T H  111G -L -j _•
ONMER ADDRESS:
T E N A N T /ADDRESS:
ATTITUDE TOWARD INVESTIGATION:
INFORMANT/ADDRESS:
SURVEYED BY: Chappell 
DATE: 1971
GENERAL SURROUNDINGS:
NEAREST WATER (NATURE, DIRECTION, AND DISTANCE):
DIMENSION OF SITE:
DESCRIPTION: On the at ternoon of May 5, 1662, this redoubt (along with
number 7, 8, and 9) was manned by South Carolina troops under Confederate 
Col. Jenkins. This was one of the redoubts attacked by Hancock in the 
afternoon. See VHLC Survey 99—41.
SPECIMENS COLLECTED:
SPECIMENS REPORTED:
OTHER DOCUMENTATION: 44JC56
C O H OITION:
R E C O M M E N D A T I O N S :
PHOTO:
RECORDED BY: Keith Eg 1 off
MAP:
DATE: 2 Dec. 19^7
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• ■ -! 11 : ;f* 2 I 'f E . ’-■-it 1 I I ’2 I TE ' iL'MDEF : 4 4 fu 3 _
-_TIJC'  Mr J I T S :  ‘ I I  X X I  I I
T > P E  O F  T I T E  : E ? i  t h « v a r  i s
' i L T1 iR m I. h F F  I L I A I I O N :  H i  c t  o r  l „ i_ j i I w a 1
J ' T  P b.FEREf I l E  : ■ b . G . 5 , Ul JAD S H E E T  Will i  amsburu
' i . 1 . :'i. ZONE I S EASTING 333470 NORTHING 4 i 2T04-'*
i INNER ADDRESS : U . 5 . Dep t . of In+rer j c<r
i  E MA N T  /  A D D R E S S :
ATTITUDE TOWARD INVESTIGATION:
1 MEQRNANT .'ADDRESS:
P U R V E Y E D  B r ' :  C h a p p e l l  
[ - A T E :  I R ”  1
GENERAL SURROUND INGS: ^sr'’. wel 1 prBS8r ve-j E p j s r s  [ c-rt. r i ne 1 oc?ti c-n ■For"
preservation and presentation to public, just south of the Colonial
Parkway, althouah one edge of the fortification seems to be owned by the 
Park Service.
NEAREST NATER (NATURE, DIRECTION, AND DISTANCE):
DIMENSION OF SITE:
DESCRIPTION: After penetrating an unoccupied section of the Confederate 
line in the morning of May 5, 1862, Gen. W.S. Hancock, advanced his forces
to the area in and around this redoubt. See VHLC Survey 99—42.
SPECIMENS COLLECTED:
SPECIMENS REPORTED: 
OTHER DOCUMENTATION: See 44JC56
CONDITION:
RECOMMENDAT IDNS:
PHOTO:
RECORDED BY: Keith Eg 1 off
MAP:
DATE: 5 Dec. 19~7
SITE BORDET FORM 97
I TAME OF SITE: U n n a m e d ITT. N U M D E F  4 4
S T U D Y  UN I I b : /, I i X I I I  X X I I I
T Y P E  O F  S I T E :  C i v i l  M a r  r e d o u b t
C U L T U R A L  A F F I L I A T I O N :  Historic
MAP R E F E R E N C E ;  U . S . G . S .  QUAD S HEET Wi 1 I i  a n i s b u r u
U .  1 . M .  ZONE I S  E A S T I N G  3 5 4 2 9 0  N O R T H I N G  4 1 2 8 4 5 ' : ’
O W N E R / A D D R E S S :  Y o r b  C o u n t v  
T E N A N T / A D D R E S S :
A T T I T U D E  TOWARD I N V E S T I G A T I O N :
I N F O R M A N T / A D D R E S S :
S U R V E Y E D  B Y :  VRCA
D A T E :  1 9 7 ’
GEN ER AL  S U R R O U N D I N G S :  C o u n t y  o w n e d  p a r i  ( N e w  Qu  a r  t  e r  P a r  L ) ,
N E A R E S T  WATER ( N A T U R E ,  D I R E C T I O N ,  AND D I S T A N C E ) :
D I M E N S I O N  OF S U L ;  
D E S C R I P T I O N ;
S P E C I M E N S  C O L L E C T E D :
• , ;T ' I M E N S  R E  P G R  I E D :
! I U I I K i r u  I H 1 I U N ;  !■!
■I i ! ; i
PE-. PlYTl N1
i NO I !J : N o  r e  ’ n o w n
R E C O R D E D  B t  : M c C a r t r e v
I !
r d D h YE ;; i
\
\
1 T E  S U R ' / E  t FORM 98
HOME O F  S I T E :  I ■! « i , - m t O  S I T E  N U M B E R
STUDY UNITS: XIi XII] XXIII
T Y P E  O F  ' S I T E :  C i v i l  Wa i  g u n  e m p l a c e m e n t
C U L T U R A L  AT F I T  I AT I O N ;  H i - t o n e
NAP REFERENCE: U.S.G.S, QUAD SHEET W i 11iamsburg
ll.TUi. ZONE IB EASTING 354540 NORTHING 4128230
OWNER/ADDRESS: T o r i  C o u n t  y
TENANT/ADDRESS:
ATT ITUDE TOWARD IMVESTI GATION:
INFORMANT/ADDRESS :
SURVEYED BY: VRCA
DATE: 1977
GENERAL SURROUNDINGS: County owned park (New Quarter P a r t . t
N E A R E S T  WATER <N A T U R E , D I R E C T I O N ,  AND D I S T A N C E ) :
D I M E N S I O N  O F  S I T E :  
D E S C R I P T I O N :
S P E C I M E N S  C O L L E C T E D :
S P E C I M E N S  R E P O R T E D :
O T H E R  DOCUMENT AT I O N :  N e w  Q u a r t e r  P a r k  r e p o r »
MA P :  M u  ■ i v c o k v
D A T E :  S e p t .  1 9 0
C O N D I  I I O N :  U n I n a r m
RE COMME NDAT  I O M S : ' Tone -  m a d e
P H  O T G : N o n e  k n o  w n
R E C O R D E D  B Y :  M c C a r t n e y / H a n  a m i
T 4  Y u  T ' >
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v  i  I ir . u t ~  t  t
i :Af IE O F  S I T E . :  F o r  v j 4 .31 I T  ' T M B t o  —
-JURY UNITS: 'II *'111
LYRE OF SITE: E^r thworl
rill.TURAL AFFILIATION: H l s t or ! r: . Civil L-J<£>r
H A P  REFERENCE: U . S .  G . S .  C'UAD SHEET Hi ] ] j a m s t - u r a  
M.I.M. ZONE 16 E A S T I N G  7-5*200 NORTH ING A I : ?7T.4w
OWNER •' ADDRESS: U . S .  &ep t. of" Interior 
TENANT/ADDRESS:
ATTITUDE TOWARD INVESTIGATION;
INFORMANT 'ADDRESS:
SURVEYED BY: Chappell 
D A T E :  1 9 7 1
GENERAL SURROUNDINGS: This well preserved d iamond-shaped tort is now d-
readied Tor opening to the public, Israely as the result ot the inter3' 
of Earl C . Hastings, and son.
NEAREST WATER (NATURE, DIRECTION, AND DISTANCE > :
DIMENSION OF SITE:
DESCRIPTION: A key wort in the Confederate line which guarded a second 
bridae to Wi 1 1 i amsbur q over Cut Dam Creek. See VHLC Survey 99—45.
SPECIMENS COLLECTED:
SPECIMENS REPORTED:
OTHER DOCUMENTATION: See 44JC56
CONDITION;
ECuMMEMDA T I QMS :
PHOTO: MAP:
RECORDED BY: Leith Eqioff DATE: 5 Dec. 1*:
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